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From: Associate Professor James Tritten (NS/Tr)
To: Captain Edward Smith, USN, Director, Intelligence Division,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-922)
Subj: PROJECT REPORT
Ref: (a) "Intelligence Database Support for Naval Arms Control,"
Masters Thesis by LTs Diego R. Corral & Richard H.
Shirer, USN, December 1991
(b) "Assessing the Impact of Reasonable Sufficiency on the
Structure and Missions of the Former Soviet Navy/"
Masters Thesis by LT Scott M. Stanley, USN, June 1992
Encl: (1) Course Outline for NS 4451, Spring Quarter, AY-92
(2) Project Report for Advanced Topics in Soviet Naval
Affairs
1. References (a) and (b) are Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
theses completed and delivered to your office prior to the com-
mencement of work by me on my current research project for you,
"The Navy in Evolving [former Soviet] Republic Military Strate-
gies." Reference (a) was completed by two unrestricted line
officers (surface and aviation) who are now naval intelligence
subspecialists . Two additional students, a Navy intelligence
officer and an Army Foreign Area Officer, are finishing up a
joint thesis tentatively titled "Future Roles and Missions of the
Russian Armed Forces," with an expected completion of December
1992. I am in the process of accepting two additional naval
intelligence officers as thesis students who will be looking at
Russian views of modern nonlinear warfare and strike reconnais-
sance complexes.
2. These theses support my own research efforts and demonstrate
the strong interrelationship between student and faculty research
at NPS. All of these existing thesis efforts have been
thoroughly coordinated with your predecessor, Captain Tom Ells-
worth, and I hope that they have been useful.
3. Captain Ellsworth and I also jointly oversaw another student
research effort, one that involved a slightly different approach
but with the same general emphasis. During the Spring Quarter of
Academic Year 1992, I offered a graduate seminar in Advanced
Topics in Soviet Naval Affairs (subsequently renamed Advanced
Topics in Russian/Central Eurasian Naval Affairs) . Since this
seminar is only required for the intelligence curriculum, I modi-
fied its contents to satisfy the curriculum sponsor.
4. Specifically, Captain Ellsworth wanted the class to look at
the emerging Russian Navy, circa 2000. We were to use only
unclassified sources and we were to use a group research tech-
nique so that the students would experience this common method of
performing research when in joint assignments. The option for
group research was accepted by the vast majority of the students
enrolled in the course. Captain Ellsworth himself spoke to the
seminar when he visited us in April 1992. Enclosure (1) is a
copy of the course outline for the seminar. You will note that
it included the participation of Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov, from the
Russian Institute for World Economy and International Relations.
5. Enclosure (2) is the final project report, prepared by ten
students and edited by myself. The student researchers included:
two naval intelligence officers, one unrestricted line
(aviation) , and two general unrestricted line officers enrolled
in the operational intelligence curriculum; one naval intelli-
gence officer and one unrestricted line officer (submarines)
enrolled in the naval intelligence (S&T) curriculum; one surface
warfare officer (who switched to naval intelligence while at NPS)
and one Army Foreign Area Officer enrolled in the Russian area
studies curriculum; and one submarine officer enrolled in the
antisubmarine warfare curriculum. Student opinions sought after
the course indicate that they enjoyed the experience of the group
project. Each of the participants learned firsthand about the
strengths and weaknesses of group efforts such as this one.
6. As for the substance of the effort, I would welcome your
comments, of course recognizing that the completion date of the
work was early June 1992. If you would like to specify some area
for consideration by the next class taking NS 4451, please con-
tact me as soon as possible.
Enclosure (1)
Associate Professor Jim Tritten QUI AY-92
Wednesday Root 204A 0810-1000 Spring
Thursday Root 228 1310-1500
Advanced Topics in Soviet Naval Affairs
[Advanced Topics in Russian/Central Eurasian Naval Affairs]
NS 4451 (4-0)
FINAL VERSION
Existing Catalog Description : Advanced study and research in
Soviet naval and maritime affairs. Topics typically include:
decision-making processes, scenarios, warfare capabilities and
support systems, missions, methodology, gaming, arms control, and
U.S. Soviet naval interactions. PREREQUISITE: NS 3450, TOP
SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED
INTELLIGENCE information.
New Recommended Catalog Description : Advanced study and research
in emerging Russian/Central Eurasian naval and maritime affairs
set into the context of contemporary political realities and a
new international security environment. Topics typically in-
clude: politico-military decision-making processes, scenario
building, revised military doctrines and strategies, new strate-
gic missions, naval operational art, warfare capabilities and
support systems, data bases and gaming, threat and net assess-
ment, and arms control. PREREQUISITE: NS 3252, 3450, TOP SECRET
clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE
information.
Course Objectives : By the end of the course, the student will
demonstrate that s/he comprehends and can apply her/his knowledge
of Russian/Central Eurasian naval and maritime affairs by con-




military and maritime concepts, doctrine, and strategy in a de-
tailed analysis of one aspect of naval/military affairs using
primary source materials. The student will demonstrate his/her
ability to analyze the new maritime threats facing the U.S. and
our allies/coalition partners from the emerging political actors
in the former Soviet Union.
Clearance Requirement : The course is basically conducted at the
UNCLASSIFIED level to facilitate the taking of notes; however,
classified (up to SECRET) discussion is encouraged and will
routinely take place. Students are encouraged to participate in
classified classroom discussions. Notes shall not be taken of
any classified classroom discussion unless the student has an
approved notebook for the safeguarding of classified material.
One session of the course will be conducted at the TS/SCI level
for those students that have the appropriate clearances. Stu-
dents should arrange to upgrade their clearances with the Special
Security Officer prior to the date indicated for this session.




Substantive Course Requirements ; Students are offered a choice
of two types of projects for which they can earn a grade; an
individual seminar paper or a collective group project. The two
choices are outlined below:
Seminar Paper Option : The first choice is a written research
paper which will be the primary tool used by the instructor to
verify the students ability to apply her/his knowledge and to
write on the subject material. The analysis should not be de-
scriptive but rather an evaluation of the topic. Assume that the
professor has researched the topic and does not need background
material. If you must describe the background, do so in one (or
two) paragraphs. The student should read anything that exists on
this subject (in Russian or Western sources)
.
The seminar paper should be about the length of a chapter in
a thesis. Full documentation is required where appropriate.
Cover folders and bibliographies are not desired. The major
point of the paper is to analyze one aspect of the subject mate-
rial of this course that will demonstrate that the student meets
the course objectives (see above) . The paper should open with an
introduction that outlines the subject to be examined and a
roadmap of where the author intends taking the reader. Heading
and subheadings should be used to break the paper into separate
sections. If appropriate, a findings sections should be included
at the end. A conclusions section should also be at the end in
every case. Conclusions should include a concise statement of
the author's main points, his analysis of the findings (if any),
opinions, and recommendations for policy/programming.
Seminar papers are due by COB Friday, June 12. The seminar
paper will be graded by the instructor and returned via the guard
mail with a grade for the paper, a grade for the oral presenta-
tion, and an overall course grade.
Seminar Paper Oral Presentation : The oral presentation
should take a maximum of 50 minutes. It should include a minimum
of background material and methodology and a maximum of results
of analysis/policy recommendations. Sufficient time should be
built in to allow for questions and answers. Copies of a one-
page outline of the presentation may be distributed and are
encouraged. Viewgraphs or slides are discouraged unless they
really aid the presenter in illustrating a point. The oral
presentation should not take the form of a military briefing.
Significant weight is given to the oral presentation as
incentive to deliver a product that can be revised prior to com-
pletion of the written seminar paper. The oral presentation is
the only opportunity to obtain comments from the instructor on
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The collective written project should not only be future-
oriented descriptive but also include an evaluation of the sub-
ject material. The instructor will work with the students during
the project to ensure proper direction. All students must par-
ticipate in some aspect of the written project.
The collective paper should be about the length of a few
chapters in a thesis. Full documentation is required where
appropriate. A bibliographies is desired. The major point of
the paper is to analyze the project material and demonstrate that
the student meets the course objectives (see above)
.
The paper should open with an introduction that outlines the
subject to be examined and a roadmap of where the authors intend
taking the reader. Assumptions driving the study should be clear-
ly identified in the beginning. Heading and subheadings should be
used to break the paper into separate major and minor sections.
A findings and separate conclusions sections should be included
at the end. Conclusions should include a concise statement of the
author's main points, their analyses of the findings, opinions,
and recommendations for U.S. policy/programming.
The collective project is due by COB Wednesday, June 17.
The collective project will be graded by the instructor and
available for discussion with the instructor after the end of the
course. The paper may be written at any level of classification
that the participants are cleared for. The paper will be pub-
lished as an NPS Technical Report and distributed to offices in
the Pentagon. I also hope to present, or have student partici-
pants present, the collective findings on the forthcoming trip to
Russia and the Ukraine.
Collective Project Oral Presentation ; An oral presentation
of research results will be made twice giving the students ample
opportunity to enhance the written product. Not all students
need to participate in the collective project presentation --
that being a matter for the collective to decide.
The oral presentation should take the entire double period
on the day scheduled. It should include background material,
methodology, and results of analysis/policy recommendations.
Sufficient time should be built in to allow for questions and
answers. Copies of an outline of the presentation should be
distributed. Viewgraphs or slides are encouraged if they aid the
presentation.
Significant weight is given to the oral presentation as
incentive to deliver a product that can be revised prior to com-
pletion of the written paper.
The oral presentation will be subject to peer review. Peer




the presentation for content and technique. A one-page evalua-
tion form will be prepared by the instructor. It will contain
narrative comments and suggestions for improvements to content
and style. The evaluation will be compiled and a subjective
evaluation will be given by the instructor to the collective in a
special debriefing.
Collective Paper Topic Approval : Students desiring to work
on a collective project will present a two-page proposal for
research at the Wednesday, April 15th class. The topic will be
presented by the collective and the instructor will ensure that
each student has a role to play in the project. Comments will be
sought from all students in the seminar and written feedback will
be obtained from the instructor. If the topic is not approved as
initially written, a revised proposal should be submitted by COB,
Thursday, April 16. Approval of a revised proposal will be sent
to the collective group of student via guard mail.
The approved proposal, as modified, will constitute a
"contract" between the instructor and the students as to what is
expected from the oral presentation and written paper. The con-
tract may be modified, in writing, by mutual consent.
Grade — Collective Project Option : Based upon classroom
presentations, written project, including peer evaluation. Peer
evaluations will be used to give the instructor an appreciation
of the participation of each student (as perceived by the other
students) in the collective project. The general weight assigned
to each of these specific areas is as follows:
Oral presentation of research 25%
Written seminar paper 75%
TOTAL 100%
Oral presentations are expected to be delivered on the
scheduled date. If the written paper is turned in late, the
collective group of students will be subjected to a half grade
penalty. At the completion of the course, grades will be submit-
ted by the instructor. No additional work may be completed after
the course to raise a grade.
Office Hours : Will be in Root Hall, Room 102, on Tuesday or
Thursday. Appointments may be scheduled by contacting me during
class or by calling me at X2143 (leave answering machine message





Texts provided by the instructor
which may be kept by the student
Yelena Agapova interview with Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin,
Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institue, with addition-
al questions by Fred Hiatt from the Washington Post , "Before You
Form an Army You Should Know What it is For—Expert Andrey Koko-
shin Believes," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, March 17,
1992, pp. 1,2 (FBIS-SOV-92-053, March 18, 1992, pp. 25-28).
Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenario Spolights Russia," Wash-
ington Post . February 20, 1992, p. 1.
"Ocean, Russia, Navy," Moscow News in English, No. 2, 12-19
January 1992, pp. 6-7 ( JPRS-UMA-92-005, February 12, 1992 pp. 38-
41).
Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, "The Navy: Problems of Reduc-
tion and Development," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 11,
November 1991, pp. 3-12 ( JPRS-UMA-92-003 , January 29, 1992, pp.
54-60)
.
Konstantin E. Sorokin, "Naval Strategy in a Renewing Union,"
Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika X Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya in Rus-
sian, No. 11, November 1991, pp. 37-50 ( JPRS-UMA-92-001-L, March
16, 1992, pp. 24-32.
Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
6th Ed., July 1991, 189 pp.
G. M. Sturua, "A View on the Navy Through the Prism of Military
Perestroyka , " Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Ot-
nosheniya in Russian, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 23-26 ( JPRS-UMA-90-
016, 11 July 1990, pp. 46-53.
Captain 2nd Rank V. Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the
Postwar Era," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 7, July
1989, pp. 22-28 (NIC-RSTP-113-89 , pp. 31-39).
Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, "Prepare Yourself for Modern
Warfare," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 1, January
1989, pp. 3-8 (NIC-RSTP-107-89, pp. 1-8).
N.P. Vyunenko, et. al., "Modern Scientific Methods of Substanti-
ating Prospects for Naval Development," in The Navy; Its Role,
Prospects for Development , and Employment in Russian, Moscow:
Military Publishing House, 1988, pp. 43-89 (NIC translation pp.
35-72) .
Petr F. Ablamonov, Admiral : Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.G.
Gorshkov in Russian, Politizdat [published in the series "Heroes
of the Soviet Motherland"], 1986, 112 pp ( JPRS-UMA-87-016-L,




R. van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-85," Naval Forces . No.
VI/1986, pp. 18-34.
Admiral P. Navoytsev, "Regularities, Content and Characteristic
Features of Modern Naval Operations," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in
Russian, No. 7, July 1986, pp. 18-23 (NIC-RSTP-076-86 , pp. 16-
24) .
Rear Admiral B. Yashin, "The Terminology of U.S. Military Doc-
trine," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 1, January 1986,
pp. 67-72 (NIC-RSTP-071-86, pp. 67-76).
"Soviet Naval Exercises: 1960-1984," NATO Review (Reprints),
(circa 1985), pp. 1-13.
Captain 1st Rank B. Maskeyev, "Some Views on the Theory of Naval
Weaponry," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 4, April 1982,
pp. 27-31 (NIC-RSTP-040-82, pp. 21-31).
Captain 1st Rank G.A. Ammon, et. al., The Soviet Navy in War and
Peace , Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980, 147 pp.
Texts on Reserve in the Library Reports Vault
Soviet Naval Strategy (U) , NIE 11-15/84D (1984) (S-217-743)
.
Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Towards the 21st Century, (U)
,
NIE 11-15/89 (1989) (S-243-986) - 6 copies available.
Project Topics
Collective Project: Russian f former Soviet"! Republic Navies 2000
Diane Burgess - surface fleet, organization, and deployments
Amy Gambrill - surface fleet, organization, and deployments
Michael Greenwood - ballistic missile submarines
Brent Griffin - cruise missile submarines
Jim Jaworski - ground forces and coastal defense
Jim Lewis - budget, readiness, and training
Jim Mcllmail - policy, doctrine, strategy
Bob Poor - budget, readiness, and training
Wade Schmidt - attack submarine fleet
Keith Wettschreck - naval aviation
Individual Projects
Mike Gannon - Cruise missile proliferation





Wednesday. April 1 & Friday April 2: NO CLASSES
- most students on travel to San Diego for intelligence experi-
ence tour.
Wednesday, April 8: COURSE INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW
- Instructor lead seminar discussion of recent events in Russia
and other former Soviet republics since we all were together in
NS 3450.
- Discussion of options for the conduct of course.
- Agreement on alternate dates for class meetings.
Thursday, April 9: PROJECT POSSIBILITIES
- Students meet with instructor and discuss initial thoughts
about individual and group projects.
- Instructor pass out provided texts.
- Students without SCI/G clearances see the SSO to obtain one.
Wednesday, April 15 : PROJECT PROPOSALS
- Students turn in to instructor initial draft proposal for
research in class and make formal presentations to students and
instructor of desired individual and group projects. Class
evaluate proposals and make oral comments to student.
Instructor to make initial comments on proposal in class to be
returned to students at the end of class.
- Students prepare revised written version of project proposals
to be turned in after next class.
Thursday, April 16: RUSSIAN NAVAL HISTORY /PROJECT PROPOSALS
- Videotape: Sergei M. Eisenstein (Director) Battleship Potempt-
kin (1925) 70 min.
- Discussion of historical background to Russian Navy and the use
of film in military and political science.
- Discussion, if required, of revised proposals.
- Students turn in revised written project proposals to instruc-
tor by COB.
Wednesday. April 22_: THE FUTURE OF THE FORMER SOVIET NAVY
- Guest seminar with Captain Tom Ellsworth, USN, OP-922.
Thursday, April 23: THE FUTURE OF THE FORMER SOVIET NAVY
- Continued discussion of issues raised by Captain Ellsworth.
Wednesday, April 2_9: BACKGROUND TO RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING
- Videotape: Chris Donnelly War and the Soviet Union: Background
to Soviet Military Thinking (1988) 45 min.
- Seminar discussion of cultural and geographic determinants of
military strategy in Russia.
Thursday, April 30: THE RUSSIAN VIEW OF WAR
- Videotape: Chris Donnelly War and the Soviet Union: The Soviet




- Seminar discussion of philosophical determinants of military
strategy in Russia.
Wednesday, May 6: STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES
- Videotape: Chris Donnelly War and the Soviet Union: The Current
Structure of the Soviet Armed Forces (1988) 4 5 min.
- Seminar discussion of organizational determinants of military
strategy in Russia.
Thursday. May 7: PROJECT REPORT SITREPS/SCI SESSION
- Each student, and the collective group, will make 5 minute
presentation of research efforts to date.
- Peer review and seminar discussion of individual and collective
efforts.
- A session will be held in the vault for those students who have
the appropriate clearances.
Wednesday, May 13 : RESEARCH PERIOD
- Instructor on travel.
Thursday, May 14 : RESEARCH PERIOD
- Instructor on travel.
Wednesday, May 20: RESEARCH PERIOD
- Students meet with instructor in office if needed.
Thursday. May 21: GROUP PROJECT REPORT
- Initial presentation of collective project results.
- Collective group to meet with instructor for feedback.
Wednesday. May 27: GROUP PROJECT MEETING
- Discussion on how to improve presentation
Thursday, May 28: INDIVIDUAL PROJECT REPORTS
- Presentation of individual project reports.
#1 Mike Ganon
#2 Scott Stanley
- Students to meet with instructor next day for feedback.
Wednesday. June 2: RESEARCH PERIOD
- Students should revise and complete their written reports based
upon comments received from instructor.
Thursday. June 4: RESEARCH PERIERIOD
- Students should revise and complete their written reports based
upon comments received from instructor.
Wednesday. June 10 : GROUP PROJECT REPORT
- Final presentation of collective project results.
- Collective group to meet with instructor for feedback.
Thursday. June 11 : RESEARCH OVERVIEW/ SOFs
- Seminar discussion of what we have learned from research ef-




- Student opinion forms.
Friday, June 12 ; INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS DUE
- All individual written projects due by COB.
Wednesday, June 17; GROUP PROJECT DUE
- Collective group written project due by COB.
Friday. June 19; FUTURE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY
- Special guest seminar with Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov, Institute
for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) , currently
a guest scholar at the RAND Corporation.
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The demise of the Soviet Union has left serious questions for
U.S. security planners as to the fate of former Soviet armed forces.
The U.S. national security strategy has for the last fifty years
dealt with the threat from the growing Soviet military machine. Now
that the USSR has formally been dissolved, what are the
implications for future US security planning? The CIS and the
republics that have emerged from the late Union still possess strong
forces that are not only in search of a mission but an identity as
well. The former Soviet Navy has been of special concern to U.S.
planners as one of the services capable of projecting power, by
nuclear or conventional means, on a worldwide scale. The ability
of the Navy to still fulfill its conventional and nuclear strategic
missions is of great importance to the U.S. While it is true that
President Boris Yeltsin has declared that the U.S. and U.K. are no
longer the enemy 1 , it is still prudent for U.S. programming and
war-planning purposes to study the evolution of the former Soviet
Navy.
As the year 2 000 approaches the former Soviet Navy will have
evolved beyond the current crisis into an as yet undetermined form,
that may or may not come into competition with the U.S. Navy.
Therefore this study will explore one possible state of the former
Soviet Navy in the year 2 000, and come to some conclusions as to the
implications for U.S. security planning.
To examine the former Soviet Navy in the year 2 000 it is
necessary to construct the force structure that the former Soviet
Union is likely to have at that point. To understand how post-Soviet
governmental decisions will be made on force structure it is also
necessary to look at the political and economic realities of the
post-Soviet era. The decisions as to that force structure depend
upon the reduction/procurement cycles, defense policies, doctrines
and strategies established by the governments that have succeeded
the former Soviet Union. Determination of the defense policies,
doctrines and strategies is also imperative in projecting the types
of employment that the post-Soviet Navy may see at the turn of the
century. This, of course, is the crux of the matter for the US
Navy, i.e. , who will it face, what will they have for forces and how
will they employ them.
Once the basic national security philosophies of the post-Soviet
governments have been established then the current order-of-battle
can be adjusted for the years leading to 2000. Each sub-category
of the Navy will be examined for developmental trends and
formulation of the projected order-of-battle. Key assumptions will
have to be made, as will be noted, to facilitate the study as the
process of transformation in the post-Soviet states is ongoing.
Implications for the US security planning arena will be drawn,
thereby establishing the relevance of the study.
1. "BBC Airs Interview With Yeltsin" London, BBC Television
Network, in English, 2230 GMT 29 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-020, 30
January 1992, p 21).
II. POLITICS, POLICY AND DOCTRINE
A. OVERVIEW
The political situation in the former Soviet Union plays a
pivotal role in the formulation of defense policy and doctrine. The
former Soviet Navy will be developed from the basic guidelines laid
down by that policy and doctrine. The determination of an
appropriate policy and doctrine is essential for the formulation of
order-of-battle and employment projections.
B. POLITICS
The USSR officially came to an end in December 1991. The
follow-on organization proposed was the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) , a loose system of independent states that would try
to cooperate on economic and security issues. Even at the outset
of the CIS it became readily apparent that the former Soviet
military was going to be radically changed. Several former
republics did not join the CIS and some that did were going to form
their own military, despite the agreements on common strategic
defense, 1 the most notable from the naval standpoint were of course
Ukraine and the Baltics. The decision by the Baltics not to join
called the future of the Baltic Fleet into serious question, while
the insistence of Ukraine on receiving the Black Sea Fleet became
the number one divisive issue for CIS security plans. 2 The inherent
weaknesses of the CIS have become very pronounced and the number of
states pursuing their own security arrangements has steadily grown,
to the point that the CIS military and the institution itself are
in very real danger of collapse. This can be seen in the recent
collective security agreement signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992,
where the agreement was signed by only six of the original eleven
members of the CIS. 3
Therefore, for the purposes of this study it will assumed that
the CIS will cease to function as the premier security organization
in central Eurasia, and that the former Soviet Navy will be divided
up among the former republics on a very unequal basis. The vast
majority of the Navy and all of its weapons systems, including
nuclear ones, will go to the Russian state. 4 The Black Sea Fleet
will be divided between Russia and Ukraine on something on the order
of an 80/20 percent split 5 with some small portion going to Georgia
as well. The Caspian flotilla will be divided among several former
republics as well. 6 The Northern Fleet and Pacific fleets will be
100 percent Russian and the Baltic fleet will cease to exist for all
strategic intents and purposes. 7
The political situation between the former republics will be a
uneasy dichotomy of economic cooperation for necessity and fear of
the rise of Russian imperialism. The forcefulness that Ukrainian
president Leonid Kravchuk has shown in forming Ukraine's military
and confronting Russia on the issue of the Black Sea Fleet 8 will
only abate if internal problems develop within the ethnic Russian
population of Ukraine, especially in the Crimea. 9 For now the
nations will cooperate but negotiations over military matters will
be protracted and difficult. The possibility of conflict between
the Russians and the Ukrainians exists but it is very small. Both
sides have too much to lose from such an encounter, but nationalist
fervor could overcome reason and precipitate a confrontation. The
base-line for Russian-Ukrainian relations to the year 2000 will be
assumed to be one of wary cooperation coupled with increasing
nationalist sentiment not culminating in conflict but certainly
precluding any sort of defensive alliance of note. Negotiations may
succeed in the Russian Navy being allowed to use Sevastopol for
basing rights for large cash payments but eventually, if relations
do not warm, the Russians will need to construct a new base in the
Black Sea. 10 The Russians will not abandon the Black Sea as it has
a significant history of strategic value. 11
The relationship with the other states will not be nearly as
acute, with the possible exception of the Baltics and Azerbaijan.
The lingering problems of troop withdrawals and economic reparations
will leave very bad feelings on both sides and the Baits will do all
in their power to limit the power of the Fleet in the Baltic. 12 It
will be assumed that Kaliningrad will remain Russian and will
contain some military and naval units but on a far smaller scale
than before. The Baits may gain some small portion of coastal
patrol boats for concessions in other areas. 13 The Caspian flotilla
will be divided up but the political relations between Russia and
Azerbaijan will probably deteriorate. The Russians may in fact
strengthen their portion of the Flotilla if they feel threatened but
this will not occur in the near term. All other states will have
no direct say in Russian Naval affairs. The Navy will be assumed
in effect to be the Russian Navy alone.
The internal Russian political scene is of importance in this
regard, with the Navy primarily under Russian control. The state
of the Russian Federation will depend upon the success of the
economic programs that Yeltsin has undertaken in 1992. The outlook
for the economic reforms is poor at present mainly due to the
political turmoil caused by the continued communist presence on the
political scene and the depths of the economic problems. The
requirement for Western aid will continually be less than needed and
the prospect of little to no growth of the Russian economy at least
until the year 2000 is very strong. 14 With this in mind the very
real possibility exists of the rise of strongly autocratic and
nationalistic rule in Russia, not of the extreme right but certainly
not of a democratic model. 15 The implications of this will include
a renewed sense of needs of defense of the homeland but not yet of
imperialistic designs. While this may give rise to nervousness in
the neighboring states it will not yet pose a serious problem for
the US. In fact one of the more likely results of the continued
economic problems and concentration upon internal problems will be
much closer cooperation with the U.S. , European Community and United
Nations on defense and peacekeeping issues. 16 All of this bodes
well for US naval concerns on the high seas.
C. MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE
Military doctrine in the former Soviet Union proceeded from
military policy and will continue to do so in the post-Soviet era.
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While a new russian doctrine has not been formulated as of yet, a
new policy for Russia has been articulated. The military policy for
the post-Soviet government of Russia will be the policy that most
directly affects the Navy and it is therefore the one that will be
dealt with for the remainder of the study. The new policy calls for
the prevention of war, the primacy of defense of the homeland, a
foreign policy that strengthens international stability, and a
defensive policy that will not be perceived as threatening by any
neighboring nations. All of this will lead to the possibility of
real reductions in the military budget so that the revenue can then
be directed to the formation of a market economy and addressing of
social problems. 17 This will be the policy that will be assumed to
be in effect in the year 2000 for the purposes of this study.
Military doctrine in the Soviet sense was defined as the set of
views accepted in a country which governed the aims and character
of possible war, preparation of the country and its armed forces for
war, and the methods of waging war. 18 This doctrine was composed of
two interdependent sides - socio-political and military-technical
.
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It is in these two areas that the debate in post-Soviet Russia, as
to the new doctrine, will be waged. The military doctrine of the
former Soviet Union was under deep review at the time of the Union's
demise. The socio-political concepts of "defensive defense" and
"reasonable sufficiency" had been foremost in the terms of review
and change in the Doctrine. 20 That trend has continued in the post-
Soviet era with these concepts becoming the standard in all articles
on the subject. 21 The problem comes in when we try to determine the
exact meaning of these concepts.
In almost all articles by now "reasonable sufficiency" has come
to mean the ability to ensure victory over an aggressor and the
inviability of borders, and if war occurs the quick resolution and
restoration of peace. 22 The Russian nuclear arsenal will be a
strong deterrent of any massive invasion and the strong military of
conventional forces will deter lesser contingencies or give the
ability to successfully defeat the enemy. The "reasonable
sufficiency" concept has taken on new meaning with the new military
policy's emphasis upon cutbacks to jump-start the economy. The fact
that the severe strain on future budgets will limit the needs and
actual acquisitions of the military well into the next century
cannot be escaped. This study will assume that this doctrine will
continue to be in place for the year 2000.
The "defensive defense" concept will call for the ability to
guard Russia's borders and do so without having to initiate an
attack or attack into enemy territory outside of Russia. This does
not mean absorbing the first blow however. 23 This raises a very
specific question for the Navy as to the distance seaward that the
defense will be extended. It will be assumed for the purpose of
this study that the defense of the coastline will be extended to 300
kilometers from the coast. 24 Again this will be assumed to be the
Doctrine in effect at the year 2000.
The military-technical side of the new Doctrine is also still
under debate, probably even more so than the socio-political side.
This side deals with the nature of the threat; the character of
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future war; force development; and methods of armed conflict,
training and preparations. 25 The new Doctrine will be assumed to
state that no nation is viewed as the enemy. 26 The new Russian
Deputy Defense Minister Andre Kokoshin has stated that the future
of war is in the low to medium-intensity conflicts and that Russian
forces should be developed with this in mind. He further states
that the combined arms heavy tank formations are an anachronism and
Russia should concentrate on high technology, mobility and
professionalization of the armed forces. Overall military strength
of the Russians will be 1.2-1.5 million men with a greatly
increased emphasis upon smart weapons, air assets, airborne troops,
amphibious warfare forces, rapid deployment forces with conscription
decreasing and contract military personnel making up the better part
of the forces, especially the Navy and Air Defense Forces. His
comments on the Navy call for high technology coupled with
downsizing, the importance of coastal defense, own-SLOC defense, as
well as strategic missile carriers in bastions of the Sea of Okhotsk
and the Barents Sea. 27
The Navy in the Soviet period did not have a separate strategy,
and this will continue in the post-Soviet era. 28 The Navy must be
studied from the doctrinal context to ascertain priorities of
employment. With the doctrinal concepts already examined in mind,
some assumptions can be made for the future of the Navy. It is
assumed that bastion defense will remain at the top of the list of
Naval priorities as will own-SLOC defense. Overseas actions outside
of this maritime defense zone will not take place although out of
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area deployments will occur for diplomatic, and peacekeeping
missions. 29 These out of area deployments will not include SSBNs
and most likely very small numbers of SSNs, ostensibly for training
missions. Intelligence-gathering ships will deploy along the
coastline and will probably tail any foreign naval vessels within
the 300 km zone. Strategic ASW will be confined to bastions and
close aboard areas for SSBN defense, not for non-Russian SSBN
prosecution.
Naval aviation will be in support of all of these missions with
primary usage probably coming in the 300 km zone for coastal
defense. The carrier program will not be ended, but will cease at
two units. 30
Ukrainian Military Policy and Doctrine will be separate from the
Russian versions. The Ukrainian policy states that Ukraine sees no
country as its enemy, desires a nuclear free and block free status
and that it has know territorial claims upon its neighbors. 31 The
Doctrine calls for defense of the coastline with an emphasis on the
economic protection and smuggling. 32 The possibility exists for the
small Ukrainian Navy to conduct brief sorties into the Mediterranean
for diplomatic and economic interests, but this has been denied by
the Ukrainian Defense Minister. 33 The Russians will almost
certainly remain active in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea but




The political situation in the former Soviet Union is the
determining factor in the formulation of defense policy and
doctrine. The Military Policy and Doctrine of the Russian State
have been generally in line with the previous evolution of Soviet
Policy and Doctrine. The major factor entering into the political
decision process is the economy. With the relatively poor prospects
for improvement in the economy to the year 2 000 the military will
deal with Policy and Doctrine that restricts it to purely defensive
actions and limited resources. The implications for the US Navy are
significant: the end of Soviet strategic ASW targeting US SSBN's;
the absence of Russian naval units on the high seas; the continued
importance of bastions for Russian SSBNs and the consequent lowering
of rational for Seawolf and Centurion; the dismantling of the
proposed Russian carrier program; and increased cooperation with the
Russians on a wider range of security issues.
With this setting of the political and doctrinal issues
presented along with the noted assumptions it is now time to turn
to the budgetary situation and its impact upon training.
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III. THE BUDGET'S EPPECT ON TRAINING AND READINESS
A. OVERVIEW
If a fundamental thesis of military readiness is that a force
"plays like it practices, " then examining the levels of activity
within the Russian navy may provide insight into its ability to
accomplish assigned missions by the turn of the century.
Traditionally, high levels of military training and readiness were
not particularly controversial within the Soviet Union and its war
economy; now, training and readiness appear to be constrained almost
solely by the budget and economic realities of a nation in
transition. In fact, according to Russian television, Dmitrii
Volkogonov, a senior advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin,
recently called for a two-year transitional period during which
defense reform could be carried out. 1 In the chaos of the current
political and military situation in the former Soviet Union, it is
of course difficult to predict the future. Nonetheless, it seems
obvious that budgetary constraints will adversely affect the future
training and readiness of the Russian navy.
B. THE OLD FACE OP THE SOVIET NAVY
Prior to the mid-1980s, military training and readiness were
closely tied to doctrine. "The Soviet concept of 'combat readiness'
(Jboyegotovnost) [was] to resist the temptation to deploy forces in
peacetime precisely so that they [would] be available in the event
of war. " 2 To this end, the Soviet navy usually kept about 15
18
percent of its fleet at sea at any time, while 30 percent were
capable of deploying at a moment's notice, another 30 percent within
about 20 days, and the final 25 percent were in refit /overhaul
.
3 So
in other words, although Soviet ships conducted less at-sea training
than their U.S. counterparts, the reasons for this were
philosophical rather than practical.
Historically, trying to assess accurately the percentage of the
Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) spent on defense has been
notoriously difficult. "The most respected and reliable sources
estimate that Soviet defence spending accounts for 15-17 percent of
GNP." 4 On the high side, a number of Soviet dissidents, who
included many of the hidden costs to the nation, argued that over
40 percent of Soviet GNP was spent on the military. 5 In any case,
it is important to remember that spending and training were designed
for a relatively high level of out-of-area deployments which
supported a naval operational-strategic policy of "offensive
defense" that included strategic defense, anti-SLOC operations, and
a presence in the Third World. Even during the era of Perestroika
and Glasnost, when Soviet naval training levels dropped off
slightly, these reductions were still a function of doctrinal and
operational-strategic needs, rather than economic realities.
C. THE CHANGING FACE OP THE CIS/RUSSIAN NAVY
Whereas, historically, Soviet political/military policy
justified the military budget, now the military budget must justify
itself within the context of the changing political/economic
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realities. As economic growth stagnated during the 1980s, former
Soviet President Gorbachev attempted to exploit the "national
investment in defence, and treat the defence sector as a reservoir
of managerial talent and advanced technology which [could] be drawn
on to revitalize the weak sector of the civilian economy.
"
6
Although this reform-within-the-system failed because more drastic
measures were needed, interestingly it appears that a "brain drain"
from the military to the civilian sector has begun to occur anyway.
In response to the current economic crisis, the Russian
Parliament recently approved draconian budget cuts for the military.
At the end of January 1992, officials said that the first quarter
budget would total 420.5 Billion (B) rubles, of which about 50B
would go to the military. That gives the military a 4.5 percent
share of GNP7 , far below the aforementioned estimates of previous
levels. Two months later, speaking on Russian television, Russian
Parliamentary Deputy Valerii Shinko said that the draft budget under
consideration called for defense expenditures of 50. 7B rubles for
the first quarter of 1992, 118. 8B in the second quarter, and an
average of 132. 6B for each of the last two quarters of 1992. 8 We
presume these vastly higher amounts for future military spending in
the draft will not survive the budgetary review process. Rather,
the huge jump in defense spending after the first quarter suggests
the military still has not fully come aboard with the fiscal
austerity program.
Even so, the effects of the current budget crisis on the
military are astonishing. For example, Russian television quoted
20
a Washington Post article that said "no Soviet surface warships are
currently to be found anywhere in the world--not any, absolutely
none!" 9 Additionally, TASS quoted a January 1992 Japanese media
report that the Russian Pacific Fleet had sharply reduced activity,
staying in port due to shortages of fuel and confusion in the
management system of the armed forces. Vice Admiral Anatoliy
Oleynik, First Deputy Pacific Fleet Commander, specifically refuted
this report by saying, "I think that in a month or six weeks our
colleagues from Japan will have work tracking our ships in the ocean
by means of satellites and aircraft." 10 There has been no evidence
of out-of-area activity by the Pacific Fleet following his
statement
.
Additionally, the Northern and Black Sea Fleets have suffered
from major fuel shortages since late 1991. "The military—like
everyone else--is desperately short of fuel. In order to maintain
combat readiness while using as little fuel as possible ships are
lying at anchor and have to all intents and purposes stopped
carrying out maneuvers." 11
Another example comes from an officer on board a Northern Fleet
Typhoon-class ballistic-missile submarine:
Take a trivial example, for instance—the device for throwing
waste containers overboard has broken. How do you get it fixed?
You cannot afford to wait for civilian experts, and as for spare
parts and tools--no, they do not get delivered to the boat. You
manage as best you can. But you cannot go to sea with a fault
like that. 12
The percentage of spending on logistics and training within the
already drastically reduced military budget has been significantly
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cut. In essence, this slashing of the budget allotted for military
hardware is being used to fund increased spending on personnel and
services. According to ITAR-TASS, expenditures on military-
equipment are to be cut by 3.5 times in real terms (1991
expenditures were reported at 39.65B rubles and the 1992 budget
assigns only 11. 2B). 13 This figure matches the DIA assessment
stated by its director, LTGEN James R. Clapper, Jr., in testimony
in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 22, 1992:
(Russia's military procurement) appears to have been cut by
about 80% from the former republic's allotment for procurement
in the same period last year. 14
Concurrently, drastic measures are planned to offset the adverse
effects of the country's economic woes on military personnel; a
survey in the conservative paper, Sovetskaya Rossiya, said that more
than 3 00,000 servicemen's families were without permanent housing. 15
And President Yeltsin, in a recent speech to 5,000 military
officers, promised that 60 percent of the new military budget would
be used for housing and other social services. 16 In fact,
reportedly "all capital investment in the military account will go
to housing for officers, many of whom now live in abysmal
conditions." 17 Although this is perhaps an overstatement,
nonetheless it points out the changing priorities within the defense
establishment
.
Ultimately, as CIA Director Robert Gates recently testified,
"Modernization programs are likely to be delayed or abandoned, and
training will be cut back, causing the readiness of conventional
forces in the former Soviet republics to be "at the lowest level in
22
many years, " with naval deployments continuing to decline from
already reduced numbers and the combat capability of general purpose
forces deteriorating because of inadequate training. 18
D. THE FUTURE PACE OP THE CIS/RUSSIAN NAVY
The future of the Russian navy apparently will be a function of
an increasing percentage of funds for personnel and decreasing
percentage for hardware and training. At the same time, the overall
naval budget will likely remain low to ease the financial burden on
the government and ease the changeover from a command economy to a
free-market economy. As A.G. Arbatov, (then) head of the Department
of Disarmament Problems of the World Economics and International
Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, pointed out in
April 1990 (to paraphrase) , if you are going to make military cuts,




Debates on the future of the Russian or Commonwealth military
structure continue, and the navy's role within that structure has
not been resolved. The draft copy of The Concept of Military Reform
(November 1990) probably still summarizes the military's desires,
In the Navy the force composition of personnel and equipment is
to be maintained at a level of defense sufficiency comparable
with the real threat to USSR interests. The combat capabilities
of the fleets are to be increased under conditions of a further
reduction in ship strength through their qualitative renewal,
and command and control systems and equipment and all kinds of
support are to be upgraded. 20
The current civilian/legislative position is characterized by
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the chairman of the Russian parliamentary budget commission,
Aleksandr Pochinok, who, according to ITAR-TASS, on 6 May 1992
criticized President Yeltsin' s (and the military ' s) defense spending
plans. He suggested that President Yeltsin has been persuaded to
continue funding for a number of high-cost military products,
including the construction of more nuclear-powered submarines. But:
in the context of impending military manpower reductions and the
difficulties faced by the Russian government in even meeting the
payroll for troops currently in services, Pochinok asked where




While it is unlikely that this debate will be resolved soon,
some overall presumptions about the future direction of military-
forces, specifically training and readiness in the navy, may be made
with a useful degree of accuracy. The degree to which the Russian
economy can support future military expenditures while at the same
time move toward a free-market system will have, as stated earlier,
a major impact on doctrine (offensive defense has already been
replaced by defensive defense) . As General V. Lobov wrote, the
military must "unequivocally demonstrate its purely defensive
character, and, at the same time, be as economical as possible and
be no burden for the country, which is in a difficult economic
position. n22
Additionally, the "difficult economic position" has had a
drastic effect on military personnel. Even in an era of personnel
cuts, the General Staff of the Commonwealth foresees manpower
shortages when the Spring 1992 selection of conscripts begins.
24
According to the Komsomol skava Pravda of 28 April 1992, "Only 28%
of the total draft-age contingent is even available for service this
year, and expected high rates of evasion will cut into the manpower
pool even further.
"
23 While this will likely have a greater impact
on ground forces, it will surely reduce the navy's capability to man
ships with competent sailors. Political realities have also
impacted on the officer corps of the navy. As one Northern Fleet
officer commented:
Unprecedented changes are taking place in the Army and Navy
today ... particularly in the officer's mentality. ... People
are sick of everything. No one wants to have to wait and hope
for politicians to agree. So it is resign and get the hell out
of this service. . . 24
Initiatives such as large pay raises for the military only
partially offset the debilitating effects of the country's economic
woes on military morale. Lack of housing, rapid inflation, and
other problems in the civilian sector also reach the military.
Paraphrasing Trotsky, the military feels all of society's ills, only
at a hotter temperature. It is difficult to quantify morale and its
role in training and readiness. Nonetheless, poor morale
undoubtably decreases readiness as much as esprit de corps serves
as a force multiplier.
Similarly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union directly
affects the institutions of training in the navy. The question of
who should control the Black Sea Fleet, where:
the overwhelming majority of of ficers--nuclear scientists and
rocketeers--are trained. .
.
[has disrupted] the integrated
organism of the Navy [and] will inevitably lead to an
appreciable reduction in the level of combat readiness, will
affect the reliability of guarding the sea lines of Russia, and
will have a negative effect on the morale of the sailors. 25
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E. SUMMARY
Estimating the cohesion of the Russian military and the status
of the Russian economy by the year 2000 is virtually impossible.
"Comparisons with past budgets are extremely difficult because of
rapid inflation, because this represents Russia's first post-Soviet
budget and because Soviet officials never released reliable budget
figures, especially about the military." 26
Out-of-area deployments have decreased nearly to nothing, as
doctrinal needs have changed. As a result, the size and frequency
of large-scale exercises have been significantly reduced. Now,
whether current levels of training are appropriate has become a
function of budget rather than mission. "The restructuring of this
economic system to provide financial-economic administrative
controls and its reorientation toward the urgent needs in improving
the well-being of the people will hardly be effective without a
radical reduction and restructuring of the military-industrial
complex.
"
27 Therefore, due to the political and economic woes of
the country, both training and readiness are, as LTGEN Clapper
testified, "in profound decline." 28
Assuming past calls by then President Gorbachev for a fifteen-
year "grace period" for the transition from a planned economy to a
free market were based on more than whim, then economic growth
during the 1990s will at best be slight. While admittedly dated,
a 1988 model of Soviet economic modernization may remain relevant.
It projected a best-case/worst-case scenario for average annual
growth rates; ultimately, in either case the average annual growth
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between 1986 and 2000 was estimated to be 2.6 percent. 29 This, it
must be remembered, was written in the context of an "orderly"
transition to a decentralized economy, and did not foresee the
complete demise of the USSR. Therefore, it seems realistic to opine
that even an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent is extremely
optimistic, and will more likely be closer to stagnancy* if not an
actual decline. Additionally, as indicated in a 1987 Rand study,
any growth in (then-Soviet) GNP most likely would have been dwarfed
by a much higher growth rate in the West. 30
The likelihood of the Russian economy's growing in real terms
seems doubtful. Similarly, the military's percentage of the budget
will "best case," from the Russian military's point of view, remain
at 4.5 percent. This money will more likely be used to placate
military personnel than to ready fleet units to fulfill their
mission. That mission itself remains under discussion, further
lowering fleet morale and readiness.
Thus, the overall outlook for training and readiness of the
Russian navy in 2000 is cloudy. The return of a more conservative
government could raise the priority of military spending.
Additionally, improvement in economic growth could lead to more
funds being available, even if funding remains at only 4.5 percent
of GNP; rapid inflation and the transformation of the military-
industrial complex, however, suggest the military's capability to
fund programs will not increase. In any case, Russia's economic
quandary points to a continued doctrine of defensive defense. Even
this new doctrine, in the context of the current chaotic economy,
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where simple training and readiness are not being fulfilled, seems
a difficult goal to achieve.
F. A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION
Trying to draw an accurate conclusion from the aforementioned
figures is like trying to complete the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel
using a paint -by-numbers kit. However, as a means of estimating the
effects of budget reductions we have broken military spending into
five main categories:
- Research and Development of future systems
- Procurement of new systems
- Maintenance of existing systems
- OPTAR
- Personnel support: salaries, housing, etc...
These categories roughly correspond to the "four pillars of defense"






For our example, we intentionally separated personnel from
hardware in order to estimate the budget remaining for the four
categories specifically related to hardware (categories 1 through
28
4) . We have presumed that previous military spending was indeed
approximately 16 percent of the GNP, and future spending will be
about 4.5 percent. Additionally, we will presume that the GNP at
the turn of the century will remain at approximately current levels.
As previously mentioned, President Yeltsin stated that 60 percent
of military spending will be for personnel (category 5) , which is
apparently a large increase. If we assume previous levels of
spending on personnel were about 10 percent of the military budget,
and the other 90 percent was dispersed between categories 1, 2, 3,
and 4, then the following is true:
[Let M = total military budget and let G = total GNP]
Previous
.10M x .16G = .016G for personnel (i.e., 1.6 percent of GNP
previously was spent on personnel)
.90M x .16G = .144G for hardware (i.e., 14.4 percent of GNP
previously was spent on research and
development of future systems,
procurement of new systems, maintenance




.60M x .045G = .027G for personnel (nearly 3 percent of GNP
will be spent on personnel, or nearly
1.7 times previous levels)
Therefore, the remaining forty percent of the (smaller) military
budget must be split between research and development of future
systems, procurement of new systems, maintenance of existing
systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR)
:
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40M x .045G = .018G for hardware (less than 2 percent of
GNP spent on hardware, about one- seventh
of previous levels, which were 14.4% of
GNP)
This level of one-seventh interestingly coincides with levels
published in a recent Washington Post article, which reported that
the Russian parliament approved a budget that contained one-seventh
the level of spending for procurement. 31 If procurement levels are
at one-seventh (14 percent) of previous levels, then spending on
maintenance, research and development, and OPTAR probably will also
be significantly reduced. While it may be foolish to suggest that
readiness of the entire fleet is at 14 percent of the level
estimated during the Soviet navy's heyday, it is safe to point out
that current out-of-area deployments are at less than 14 percent of
previous levels.
Of course, a more efficient use of existing resources as well
as a reduction in unnecessary systems, which are expensive to
maintain and equip, could skew upwards the readiness levels of the
rest of the fleet. However, the previously stated anecdotal
evidence suggests that "efficiency" and "management" of Russian
naval assets are words that do not belong in the same sentence.
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In the year 2000, the former-Soviet Union submarine ballistic
missile (SSBN) force will be smaller, more survivable, and more
accurate. Like its predecessor, it "... [will be] obliged to provide
against the unleashing of nuclear war and the restraint of a
potential enemy first and foremost...." 1 Consequently, because of
its unique capabilities as a nuclear reserve force, Russia will not
scrap its entire SSBN force. Rather, the navy's nuclear arsenal




Unarguably, the former Soviet Union had the largest attack
submarine force in the world. The U.S. Navy has spent vast amounts
of money and used immense resources to counter the possibility of
combating this formidable foe. But as with all other military
branches of the ex-Communist state, this force was sustained by an
extreme economic system. Now that the Soviet Union has broken into
independent republics, the attack submarine force must set realistic
priorities, goals, and missions based on the fiscal constraints of
a free market society. The new missions and capabilities will
probably have a major effect on the size and composition of the U.S.
Navy. Pragmatically the resultant submarine force should be smaller
in number and arguably less effective due to the scarcity of money
for training and exercises. A rational approach for determining the
attack submarine force of the former Soviet Union in the year 2000
must include determination of the missions, construction rates and
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decommissioning rates applied to the current submarine force, and
the political division of the fleets.
B. BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
1. FLEETS AND BASES
Presently, Russian SSBNs are deployed in two fleets: North
Fleet (NORFLT) and Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). 3 In the North Fleet,
there are four bases which currently support SSBNs on the Kola
Peninsula. In the Pacific, bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk
support the PACFLT SSBN forces. 4
The NORFLT force consists of all six former-Soviet classes
of SSBNs: Typhoon, Delta IV, Yankee I, Yankee II, Delta I/II, and
Delta III. In contrast, the PACFLT has none of the newest classes,




Looking ahead to the turn of the century, Russia will
continue to divide the SSBN force between the NORFLT and PACFLT.
Though it is more expensive to maintain two separate SSBN
facilities, a balanced force is consistent with Russia's Soviet
naval tradition. Consequently, Russia will realize the desired cost
savings by reducing its operational SSBN bases to only one base per
fleet; the remaining bases would then be used as temporary storage
for nuclear submarines designated for disposal. The NORFLT force
will be based at the Nerpichya facility; Nerpichya is the only base
which has the infrastructure to support the Typhoon class submarine.
Similarly, the PACFLT SSBN force will be homeported at Rybachiy;
Rybachiy, unlike Pavlovskoye, has supported the most advanced
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ballistic missile submarines in the PACFLT inventory.
2 . ORDER-OP -BATTLE
The Russian ballistic missile submarine order of battle,
hamstrung by economic constraints, will exist as a purely defensive-
defense force. 6 Presently, the force consists of approximately
fifty-nine ballistic missile submarines. 7 Of that total six are
Typhoons, seven are Delta IVs and the remainder are the older less
capable Delta I/II/IIIs and Yankee I/IIs. 8 To date, the Typhoons
and Delta IVs have only been assigned to the NORFLT. By the
year 2000, budgetary pressures and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) requirements will slash the number of SSBNs. This force will
consist of the Typhoons and Delta IVs. Though it is conceivable
that the newer Delta III platforms could be retained until the year
2000, the Delta Ill's SS-N-18 missile system will be at seventeen
years of service and the expense of maintaining the missile system
may be prohibitive relative to the increased deterrent value. 9
Consequently, it is unlikely that the SSBN force will be augmented
by the older classes.
Similarly, it is just as unlikely that new construction will
increase the number of SSBNs; presently, there are no SSBNs under
construction. In fact, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin's stated
that " . . .New strategic missile carriers will . . . not be built or put
into service with the fleet in the next ten years." 10 Thus the
heart of the submarine ballistic missile force will consist of the
thirteen Typhoon and Delta IV units already in service.
The six Typhoons are armed with twenty SS-N-2 MOD 1 and MOD
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2 missiles. 11 Depending on the MOD, the missile supports eight or
ten MlRV's for a total of 960-1200 warheads. 12 The calculated
equivalent megatonnage for the Typhoon class ranges from 206.8 to
258.5 EMT. 13 Lastly, all the Typhoons will remain in the NORFLT at
the Nerpichya facility, which is the only base capable of supporting
the class.
The Typhoon force will be complemented by seven Delta IV s.
Though each Delta IV is capable of sixteen SS-N-23 missiles with ten
MlRV's, the START Treaty limits each SS-N-23 to four RV's. Hence,
the Delta IV s present 1120 warheads will drop to 448 total
warheads. 14 This corresponds to 153.2 EMT for the class. Though
presently homeported in the NORFLT, the Soviet Union's propensity
for a balanced fleet should manifest itself in Russia's transfer of
Delta IV s to the PACFLT; this is reasonable considering there is
no existing infrastructure which would support fleet transfers of
Typhoons to the Pacific, 15and construction of such facilities would
be beyond the ability of the Russian economy. Finally, the total
equivalent megatonnage for the whole force is 3 60-411.7 EMT.
3 . DEPLOYMENT
Deployment and operation of the Russian SSBN force will be
driven by the goal of achieving sufficient deterrence at minimum
cost:
A sufficient means of preventing world wars directed against
Russia and CIS member states is provided by the strategic
nuclear forces, whose composition should be regulated on a
treaty basis taking into account the need to preserve those
resources that best meet the requirements of nuclear safety
and minimum cost. 16
Consequently, Russia will utilize a mix of underway and inport units
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on combat ("alert") patrol. 17 By employing the former-Soviet
practice of utilizing inport units on combat patrol, Russia could
significantly slash operational costs without sacrificing national
security. 18 In addition, the use of in-port combat patrols have the
added advantage of greatly simplifying the command and control of
this strategic assets. Lastly, the in-port platforms can be
maintained at optimum readiness and, with adequate warning, be
sortied to provide maximum deterrent and second strike capability.
Despite the advantages of keeping the ballistic missile
submarines inport, their susceptibility to a first strike will deter
the Russians from keeping all SSBNs on in-port combat patrol.
Historically, the Soviets have maintained 80% of their SSBN force
in port. 19 Though it appears "unwise" for Russia to keep 10 of
its 13 units in port, they are incapable of maintaining more SSBNs
at sea. Consequently, they must rely on a cheaper alternative:
obtaining adequate warning time to sortie the inport SSBN units. 20
Hence, three of the thirteen SSBNs will be at sea at any
time. The remainder will be in various stages of inport combat
patrol, preparing for underway combat patrol, in transit to or from
combat patrol, or in overhaul. Optimally, this results in a maximum
of 86.9-108 EMT deployed at any time. Considering the goal is
sufficient deterrence at minimum cost, this EMT appears to be
adequate.
Finally, rather than deploying to open ocean, these
submarines will patrol submarine coastal sanctuaries, i.e. bastions,
in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. 21 In doing so, these
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critical units are afforded the maximum amount of protection by-
submerged, surfaced and land-based assets. Yet, even if Russia
cedes the Kurile Islands, the dual bastion concept will remain;
thus, maintaining Russian naval balance and enhancing second strike
survivability.
4. IMPACT OP THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)
Of the many factors affecting the Russian ballistic program,
the most compelling external force is the START Treaty. This
treaty's requirements will slash the number of SLBM's. For Russia,
the START limits mandate a 41% reduction in all ballistic missile
warheads, nuclear armed air-launched cruise missiles, and heavy
bombers; a 3 6.5% decrease in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles' s;
and a 47.9% reduction in ICBM and SLBM warheads. Concurrently,
START authorizes a 66.7% increase in Russian land-based mobile
ICBM's. 22
According to the military doctrine, which is still being
drafted, preference will be given to ground-based strategic
nuclear forces that are less expensive and easier to control
internationally. The navy's nuclear missile arsenal will be
radically reduced. 23
Considering the overall shortcomings of Russian SLBM systems,
e.g. complicated C 2 , expense, and poor SSKP24 , and Russia's desire
for maintaining a second strike capability, dismantling the older
and less capable ballistic missile platforms is the best means of
achieving this end.
5 . RECONSTITUTION
Though the excess submarines will eventually be scrapped,
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this will not occur anytime soon. The pace of SSBN, and other
nuclear vessel dismantlings will be driven by the availability of
facilities to remove and process missiles, nuclear propulsion
equipment, and other hazardous materials
.
25In the mean time, SSBN
hulls may be stored along piers of unused naval bases. Yet, despite
the availability of excess SSBNs, the preservation required to
maintain a nuclear submarine is prohibitive to reconstitution and
counter-productive to the goal of decreasing costs. Hence,
reconstitution is highly doubtful.
C. ATTACK SUBMARINES
1. MISSIONS
Admiral Chernavin has stated that the chief missions of the
Russian Navy is to deter war, to defend Russian interests in time
of conflicts, and to help restore the peace. 26 In the same article,
ADM Chernavin stated the general purpose forces, including the
attack submarine force, must be capable of performing three major
missions while operating in conjunction with the other Russian
military organizations: protection of the strategic nuclear systems,
defense of Russian interests and territory, and protection of the
sea lines of communication. These missions require a submarine
force with a variety of capabilities. A review of each mission and
its requirements is necessary to help develop a projection of the
attack submarine force eight years into the future.
a. Protection of the Ballistic Missile Submarines
There is no doubt that the primary mission of the attack
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submarine force will continue to be the defense of the ballistic
missile submarines. This mission is carried out in two ways,
patrolling of bastion entrances and conducting "pro-SSBN"
operations. The patrolling of the bastion accesses requires
submarines which can stay on station for several weeks in shallow
areas and have the ability to detect and destroy opposing surface
ships and submarines. These submarines could be either nuclear
powered attack submarines (SSNs) or diesel powered submarines (SSs) .
While the SSN is obviously better suited to maintaining its covert
condition, the diesel is able to perform the mission at a
significantly cheaper procurement , maintenance, and personnel cost.
The pro-SSBN deployments require submarines capable of sustained
operations with the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines.
This operation while capable of being performed by either an SS or
SSN is a role best filled by an SSN due to its ability to maintain
high speeds and sustained submerged operations. In the event of war
with Russia, the U.S. Navy will still have a formidable task in
attacking the strategic missile submarines.
Even under conditions of a great reduction in the Navy, in the
"bastions" it would be possible to achieve a high concentration
of all available and mutually reinforcing assets including
diesel submarines and land-based aircraft with a limited radius
of action, as well as to make active use of mine ordnance. 27
The implications for the U.S. submarine force are obvious; quiet,
nuclear submarines are still needed in the event of war with Russia.
b. Defense of Russian Interests and Territory
The defense of Russian interests out to 3 00 km requires
an attack submarine force which is capable of conducting ASW and
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ASUW blue water operations. The submarines must be sophisticated
and quiet, while maintaining enough firepower to stop an opposing
naval force from approaching the Russian coastline. The attack
submarines must be able to maintain station up to 300 km from the
coast for extended periods of time while awaiting the approach of
the enemy naval forces. The farther out from shore and away from
friendly aircraft protection the submarines must patrol, the more
advantageous the SSN becomes relative to the SS. The "indiscretion
rate" of the SS becomes an achilles heel and exposes the submarine
to attack from opposing anti-submarine aircraft and surface ships.
The U.S. submarine force could deploy into this 300 km coastal
defense zone and launch strikes with TOMAHAWKS. The remaining U.S.
forces will be required to stand-off out of range of most of these
forces, or ensure that the threat is reduced or eliminated.
c. Protection of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)
The same basic capabilities described in the defense of
the coastline are required for the protection of the SLOCs. Most
Russian merchant ships in time of possible conflict will probably
maintain tracks close to the coast of Russia and it neighbors,
thereby favoring the use of Russian diesel submarines to protect
them from attacks by other submarine forces. The major implication
for the U.S. Navy is that only fast attack nuclear submarines have
the ability to threaten the Russian SLOCs.
2. THE ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE NUMBERS
Several recent articles by top Russian Naval Officers have
stated that the Russian general-purpose submarine force consists of
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"163 attack submarines, including 88 nuclear-powered ones." 28 While
there are no clear distinctions how many of each class of submarine
are included in these numbers, some basic assumptions can be made
which probably give a fairly accurate Order Of Battle (00B) . The
163 must include both attack and cruise missile submarines. That
number must also include the modern and recently built submarine,
i.e. 7 AKULAs, 3 SIERRAs, 2 6 VICTOR Ills, 7 VICTOR lis, 15 VICTOR
IS, 17 KILOs, 18 TANGOS, 6 CHARLIE lis, 10 CHARLIE Is, 6 OSCAR lis,
and 2 OSCAR Is. These numbers give totals of 83 nuclear powered
submarines and 35 diesel boats. The 6 missing nuclear boats
probably are 2 YANKEE NOTCHs, 1 YANKEE SSGN, and 4 ECHO lis, and the
4 missing diesel boats are probably divided between the JULIETT and
FOXTROT classes.
a. Construction and Conversion
Due to very limited fiscal resources, the construction
of most attack submarines will probably be delayed or cancelled.
According to Jane's Fighting Ships, there are 6 AKULA SSNs, 3 SIERRA
II SSNs, and 5 KILO SSs in various stages of construction. These
submarines will probably be completed. The financial constraints
under which Russia will be operating will almost guarantee that
there will be no funding for further nuclear submarine construction,
but with the possibility of maintaining the construction of the less
expensive diesel submarines supported by the selling of every other
unit to a foreign government. This could cause an increase in the
number of KILO submarines available to the rest of the world. Also
due to the limited financial resources, all conversions will stop
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and no further units will be converted from one type of submarine
to another, i.e. SSBN to SSN.
b. Decommissioning
a
There is very little available information covering the
actual or planned decommissioning of ex-Soviet submarines. The
shortage of information could be for security reasons, but a more
likely reason is that no one actually knows how Russia is going to
remove the submarines from the operational force.
(1) Diesel Submarine Scrapping. Russia has stated that
many of the older submarines are being removed from service. The
decommissioning and dismantling/scrapping of the diesel submarines
is fairly easy. The submarines can be sold to numerous foreign
scrapping yards in Spain, India, or a number of other countries.
Although the possibility exists for Russia to sell the operational
boats to Third World nations desiring to develop submarine forces,
these boats are in varying states of disrepair and they are mostly
obsolete.
(2) Nuclear Submarine Scrapping. The scrapping of
nuclear submarines is another problem entirely. The Russians will
probably run into the same problem as the United States, that is
there is only a limited number of shipyards capable of properly
handling nuclear fuel and these are needed to repair and maintain
the operational submarines. To sacrifice pier and drydock space in
these few shipyards to eliminate a deteriorating and antiquated
NOVEMBER Class SSN rather than performing maintenance on a front
line AKULA SSN does not make sense to an operational naval
43
commander. The only option left is to tie the nuclear submarines
to a pier in a submarine base until a nuclear scrapping yard is
built or the lack of maintenance on the operational boats allows
time and space for the scrapping of a nuclear submarine. While
awaiting to be scrapped, which could take a few years or a few
decades, the submarines could be considered "reconstitution forces".
Taking into account condition and obsolescence of the submarines
which will probably be decommissioned (VICTOR Is, VICTOR lis,
WHISKEYS, and YANKEES), the threat to the U.S. Navy is almost
insignificant if these submarines are reconstituted. The ability
of Russia to reconstitute these submarines is extremely skeptical.
3. THE CHANGES TO THE FLEETS
The submarine force will not suffer the drastic partitioning
that the other components of the ex-Soviet military are undergoing.
Russia will undoubtedly retain control of all the nuclear-powered
fast attack submarines. This is due mainly to the costly expense
and extensive infrastructure required to build and maintain these
submarines. The Ukraine will take control of at least 3 diesel
submarines and possibly as many as 5. Although these could be new
KILOs, Russia is likely only to release the older FOXTROTS or maybe
TANGOs. Russia will retain a fleet of about 5 to 8 diesel
submarines in the Black Sea. These will probably be a combination
of KILOs for coastal defense and TANGOs for extended patrols in the
Mediterranean. The Baltic Fleet will maintain 5 diesels at St.
Petersburg. These will likely be the smaller KILOs due to the
shallow depths encountered in the Baltic Sea. The Northern Fleet
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will remain the primary fleet (with about 60% of the submarines)
.
All of the SIERRAs will be based at the Northern Fleet bases along
with some of the AKULAs, VICTOR Ills, and KILOs. The Pacific Fleet
will remain secondary (with about 40%) . These will be entirely
AKULAs, VICTOR Ills, and KILOs.
4 . OPERATIONS
The pace of coastal patrols will probably not decrease
considerably. These patrols are needed to maintain crew proficiency
and a credible conventional deterrent. The major change in
operations will come from the elimination of routine Out-Of-Area
(OOA) patrols. These are very costly and inconsistent with the new
defensive-defense policy. In times of crisis, the Russian Navy
could possibly send one or two attack submarines to the region for
a short period of time. Russia will likely retain the ability to
deploy world wide to protect their interests. 29 If there is a
friendly naval base nearby, the Russians could maintain a continuous
patrol of a crisis region using only two or three submarines. Of
course more submarines would be needed for remote locations. To
protect the SSBNs, the SSNs and SSs will continue the pro-SSBN
patrols which were so common during the Cold War. These patrols are
needed to ensure the continued deterrent value of the SSBNs by
verifying that there are no unfriendly submarines following the
SSBNs. In conjunction with the pro-SSBN patrols, the attack
submarine force will maintain the patrols of bastion accesses to
confirm that the bastions are free of non-Russian submarines and
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allow the SSBNs to patrol unhindered,
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NO. CLASS YEAR BUILT
1 VICTOR III 1978
2 VICTOR III 1979
3 VICTOR III 1979
4 VICTOR III 1979
5 VICTOR III 1980
6 VICTOR III 1980
7 VICTOR III 1980
6 VICTOR III 1981
9 VICTOR III 1981
10 VICTOR III 1981
11 VICTOR III 1982
12 VICTOR III 1982
13 VICTOR III 1982
14 VICTOR III 1983
15 VICTOR III 1983
16 VICTOR III 1983
17 VICTOR III 1984
18 VICTOR III 1984
19 VICTOR III 1984
20 VICTOR III 1985
21 VICTOR III 1986
22 VICTOR III 1987
23 VICTOR III 1988
24 VICTOR III 1989
25 VICTOR III 1990
26 VICTOR III 1991





















Possibly decommissioned instead of being
D. CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES
1. Missions
The missions of Russian general purpose submarines, including
nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) , are directly-
related to overall Navy missions. This study assumes the Russian
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Navy's primary missions in 2000 will include: (1) defense of the
homeland; (2) protection of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs);
and (3) defense of Russian sea lines of communication (SLOC)
.
Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin described these missions in November
1991:
The principal missions of the general-purpose forces of our navy
are in essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical
preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic
nuclear system under any conditions and, second, creating and
maintaining such operational conditions in the maritime theaters
that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to
start and wage operations.... In the event of aggression our
general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on
enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-
scale operations or those in depth by him, as well as ensuring
the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective
performance of defensive operations in the continental theaters
of military operations in conjunction with the other branches of
the armed forces. 30
The Russian SSGN force will play an integral role in these naval
missions
.
Defense of the homeland will remain an important role for
general purpose submarines. SSGNs will focus on defending Russian
territory from sea-based offensive threats, including U.S. carrier
battle groups (CVBGs) , amphibious readiness groups (ARGs) , sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM) -carrying platforms, and submarines. 31
This study assumes a 300 kilometer military defensive zone around
the Russian periphery. Potential adversaries within this zone are
subject to measured defensive reactions. The SSGN force also will
participate in SSBN protection and SLOC defense. General purpose
submarines, along with naval air and surface assets, will continue
to provide a "defense in-depth" for Russian SSBNs operating in
strategic bastions. "Strategic stability" for SSBNs will remain the
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highest priority naval mission. Russian SSGNs also will be tasked
to defend strategic SLOC during hostilities. This study assumes SLOC
interdiction will not be a primary naval mission in 2000 and,
therefore, will not be addressed.
The SSGN force will remain militarily important despite a
projected decrease in U.S. CVBGs and amphibious readiness groups by
2000. The growing threat posed by new and additional SLCM- carrying
platforms coupled with the decreasing capabilities of older Russian
SSGNs will justify continued, albeit reduced, production of modern
SSGNs. 32 Admiral Chernavin emphasized the importance of submarines
while discussing general purpose forces: "... we feel that priority
in their [general purpose forces] development should be assigned to
the submarine forces, comprising the foundation of the strike
potential of the fleet and a universal branch of the services able
to fight any naval enemy effectively." 33 The Russian SSGN force,
however, will undergo a dramatic numerical reduction this decade
despite its continued military importance.
2. Order-of-Battle
The current Russian SSGN and SSG (conventionally-powered
cruise missile submarine) order-of-battle (GOB) reflects an aging,
yet still formidable force:
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PLATFORM 1992 OOB YEARS COMMISSIONED
Oscar I SSGNs 2 1980-1983
Oscar II SSGNs 7 1983-present
Charlie I SSGNs 9 1968-1972
Charlie II SSGNs 6 1973-1982
Echo II SSGNs 3 1960-1967
Mod-Echo II SSGNs 15 1960-1967
Juliett SSGs 15 1961-1963 34
Total 57
The majority of these units face block obsolescence and are
being decommissioned after 25 years of service. 35 This study assumes
all Charlie I SSGNs, Echo and Mod-Echo II SSGNs, and Juliett SSGs
will be out-of-service by 2000. Older Charlie II SSGNs also will be
decommissioned. 36 This represents a potential reduction of 44
SSGNs/SSGs by 2000. These units, which may remain pierside awaiting
disposal, will not be reconstitutable. Additionally, the
construction rate for Oscar II SSGNs--the only SSGN currently being
produced--is slowing. 37 The Soviets had produced one Oscar I or II
approximately every 1.3 years (i.e., nine units between 1980 and
1991) . This study arbitrarily assumes that the rate will decrease
to approximately one Oscar every 2.6 years. Three additional units,
therefore, may be launched by 2000. The projected SSGN OOB becomes:
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PLATFORM 2 00 OOB
Oscar I SSGNs 2
Oscar II SSGNs 10
Charlie II SSGNs 4
Total 16
3. SS6N Disposition
Russia will be the only former Soviet republic to have SSGNs.
SSGNs will remain exclusively in the Russian Northern and Pacific
Fleets. This study assumes the Northern Fleet will retain
approximately 55 percent of SSGN assets. The SSGN disposition by
2000 is projected to be:
FLEET OOB
Northern Fleet 9 Oscar/Charlie SSGNs
Pacific Fleet 7 Oscar/Charlie SSGNs
Oscar II SSGNs, which are constructed at Severodvinsk in the
Northern Fleet, must conduct future transfers to the Pacific Fleet
to achieve this disposition. 38
4 . Nature of SSGN Operations
Russian SSGNs, like the other general purpose forces, will
continue to experience a lower operating tempo (OPTEMPO) . Naval
OPTEMPO, defined as the total number of days a unit spends at sea
relative to the time it is available to go to sea, has declined
since the late-1980s due to resource constraints. 39 Manifestations
of reduced OPTEMPO include a decrease in exercise frequency and
scope, along with a reduction in out-of-area deployments. Military
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exercises have been defensively-oriented since the 1987 announcement
of the new defensive doctrine. Large-scale exercises were still
conducted in the late-1980s; however, recent exercises have been
scale-downed. 40 Rear Admiral Sheaf er, USN, the Director of Naval
Intelligence, stated in February 1992:
Poor economic conditions have led the [Russian] navy to reduce
further the scale of major exercises since 1989. Last year was
the first year the navy did not participate in any large-scale,
fleet-wide exercises. Instead, it started training with smaller-
scale, shorter-duration exercises that were coordinated with
other services and that focused on one or two warfare missions. 41
Out-of-area deployments to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and other
regions also have been dramatically reduced or eliminated. Rear
Admiral Sheafer stated "... by the end of the year [1991] the only
combatant deployed outside CIS local waters was a guided missile
patrol boat stationed at Cam Ranh Bay.
"
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These general trends, caused by economic constraints, will
continue into the next century. General purpose units will operate
at OPTEMPO levels designed to maintain minimum tactical proficiency
while reducing operations and maintenance costs. Exercise
participation also will be reduced, however, the role of SSGNs will
remain important. Rear Admiral Sheafer stated:
The 1991 navy exercises, although severely limited, continued to
reflect the military's concerns about Western advantages in sea-
based tactical aviation, land-attack cruise missiles, and
forward-deployed attack submarines. Military planners obviously
still considered it important to conduct exercises depicting the
most dangerous threat (a no-warning or short-warning scenario
from forward-deployed Western naval forces) , even though Soviet
political leaders (and the leaders of the Soviet Union's
evolving successor states) probably viewed such scenarios as
less likely than in the past. 43
SSGN out-of-area deployments will be infrequent, if conducted at
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all. The future of Russian SSGN operations will reflect a force
focused on defensive operations in contiguous waters.
5. SSGN Exports to Foreign Countries
Older SSGs and SSGNs (e.g., Julietts and Echo lis) may be
exported to various countries for scrapping; however, it is unlikely
they will be exported for military purposes. The units are
considered militarily obsolete and dangerous to operate, posing a
significant safety hazard for potential buyers. Third World
countries, however, may express interest in newer Charlie I or II
SSGNs. India, for example, leased a Charlie I SSGN from 1988 through
early-1991. The Charlie reportedly was exported without missiles. 44
India also reportedly experienced various operational difficulties
with the SSGN, including power plant trouble. 45 The adverse impact
of this experience on other Third World clients is unknown.
This study assumes other nations, for various political and
military reasons, may seek to purchase Charlie I and/or lis. This
study also assumes Russia will not export Oscar I or II SSGNs. The
Russian Navy, in view of the projected reductions in the overall
SSGN order-of-battle by 2000, cannot militarily afford to export
Oscars--they need all of them to maintain a reasonable defensive
capability. Oscar SSGNs also are the largest, most complex SSGNs in
the world. Third World countries likely could not afford nor
adequately support them. Overall, future SSGN exports will largely
consist of units destined for scrapping. Military exports, while




As a result of the changes in the Russian SSBN force the United
States' security implications can be summarized as:
- The United States can significantly decrease its strategic
deterrent force.
- The demise of the former-Soviet strategic offensive threat
allows the United States to refocus its security interest
towards regional conflicts and threats.
- The United States is justified in decreasing its number of
SSN's. However, the final number and type of SSN must be
capable of operating for an extended period undetected in the
Russian bastions.
- A streamlined, upgraded Russian force will be the foundation of
a significant threat to the United States. Russia will have
discarded its least capable and most expensive assets, while
retaining its best. Hence, the US must invest in intelligence
indications and warning capabilities to ensure adequate
forewarning to allow timely reconstitution of US forces.
Russia will continue to be a viable nuclear threat to the United
States. In fact, the Russian SSBN force will be qualitatively
better in the year 2000. It is upon this foundation that Russia
will be propelled into the 21 st Century.
The drastic changes occurring within the former Soviet Union are
causing many transformations within the Soviet military. The least
affected of the military communities should be the operational
submarine force. Although the size and makeup of the entire Russian
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submarine force will be altered, the reductions will come from
deteriorating and obsolete units. The remaining force will be much
newer and extremely capable, but the lack of operational deployments
and training will likely cause a reduction in capabilities. The
U.S. Navy will not face a threat of the type that has caused
apprehension during the past forty-five years, but the threat from
the newer Russian submarines will present a force that the U.S. Navy
must counter by maintaining a credible ASW capability. Abandonment
of ASW as a priority in U.S. Navy planning will become a force
multiplier for the Russian submarine force in the future.
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The surface forces of the former Soviet Union will be
significantly reduced by the year 2000. In March 1991, Admiral
Feodor I. Novoselov, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for
Shipbuilding said that "expenditure (s) for shipbuilding had dropped
by 9-10 percent in 1990 and by 23 percent in 1991 by comparison with
1989, without taking inflation into account." 1
In addition, funds allocated for ship maintenance are reported
to have been "reduced by 50 percent and research and development
appropriations have been cut by 40 percent. The first measure, the
decrease in shipbuilding expenditures, will affect the Soviet Navy's
ability to update older warships. The second is bound to have a
serious impact on the development of the Soviet Navy before the year
2000. " 2
Many of the 218 principal surface combatants are currently in
port or coastal waters, and their tactical nuclear weapons are being
disabled, removed, and stored. Many of these ships are "poorly
maintained, so that the Navy is rapidly deteriorating.
"
3 For the
first time since the 1960's no Soviet naval combatants are deployed
in the Mediterranean Sea or Indian Ocean. 4
Under the assumption that there will be no Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) by the year 2000, as stated in chapter two,
the fleet will be divided between the individual republics which
show an interest in creating their own fleets. As a result, there
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will be no CIS navy, and any form of combined operations will
require the cooperation of the republic navies and leadership.
In a roundtable discussion on Moscow television, Navy Captain
Sergie Kozyrev stated that Russia's national interests are the
"world's oceans" and not just its borders. 5 Chief Navigator of the
Soviet Navy, Rear Admiral Valery Aleksin in his support of continued
use of aircraft carriers for the defense of the seas said "if we
wish peace for our country we must maintain military presence in the
world oceans." 6
Another view was expressed by Konstantin Sorokin of the Russian
Academy of Sciences. He believes it is:
necessary to reject existing quasi-oceanic policy, give
preference to a less ambitious one and concentrate defense
efforts on a regional level... and relying on the Northern and
Pacific 'security zones, ' follow a course to preventing war,
including at sea. 7
He is basically saying that Russia should concentrate its
efforts on coastal operations while maintaining the ability to go
to sea. Andrey Kokoshin, also of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
has said:
It is absolutely essential that we have small but efficient
general-purpose forces, including a navy, which is needed
not only for coastal defense but for the defense of the
strictly regulated interests of Russia and its CIS allies. 8
Sorokin and Kokoshin appear to share one point of view on this
matter while Kozyrov and Aleksin share another. Kokoshin 's
reference to "strictly regulated interests" probably encompasses
responses to smuggling, sea and coastal lines of communication and
violations of sovereignty of the individual republics. It seems
most likely that the Russian navy will become mainly a coastal navy,
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operating within to 300 kilometers of the shore, while at the same
time still having the capability for limited deployments if
necessary. If they were to deploy, the Navy would have to take into
consideration that there would be little to no air cover and limited
underway replenishment capability.
B. DISPOSITION OP THE FLEETS
While a few republics will possess their own surface naval
forces, Russia will remain the dominant naval force of all of the
republics due to its economic power to control the military budget. 9
This is possible because Russia currently has the budgetary
mechanisms in place. Looking first at each of the current fleets
in being, and taking into consideration the political and doctrinal
goals of the republics, some conclusions can be drawn about their
future.
1. The Northern and Pacific Fleets
The Northern and Pacific Fleets are located in total on
Russian soil, and thus they will remain Russian fleets in their
entirety. The reductions in force they are sure to suffer will be
attributed to the scrapping of ships which are obsolete and selling
off of assets which can not be supported by the budget.
Apparently all surface ships and submarines still carrying
nuclear weapons are in the Russian controlled Northern and Pacific
Fleets, although there is a possibility that nuclear weapons do
remain in a few antisubmarine cruisers of the Black Sea Fleet. 10 As
Kokoshin outlined future military needs, he expressed the belief
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that Russia will need "not only coastal defense naval forces
collaborating with aviation and land forces, but some proportion of
the strategic missile carriers deployed on combat patrol in the
Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk regions." 11 While the Russians may
not have continuous patrols in these areas, they are certain to
carry out occasional patrols to defend the homeland from maritime
attack. These have traditionally been considered to be the two
areas most vulnerable to attack.
The current CIS Pacific Fleet has withdrawn all nuclear-
powered submarines from the Vladivostok naval base and has undergone
reorganization. According to Captain First Rank Viktor Ryzhkov, the
first public relations officer appointed to the Pacific Fleet, "the
Pacific Fleet headquarters has been moved ashore and the former
flagship, Admiral Senyavin, has been struck from the list. There
is now no designated flagship." 12 Paper order of battle for the
fleet included 45 large surface combatants (including aircraft
carriers Minsk and Novorossiysk) , 380 small surface combatants, and
various submarines and aircraft. Over 20 warships have been paid
off and some scrapped. 13 Due to fuel shortages, less than 12 large
surface combatants and 20 Tarantul II/III missile corvettes
regularly put to sea. 14
The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are said by Konstantin
Sorokin, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, to play secondary roles
to the Northern and Pacific Fleets. He stated that their losses
"would be tolerated" and that it would be possible to transition
into maintaining solely the Northern and Pacific Fleets. 15
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Sorokin has said that the Baltic and Black Sea assets could
reinforce the Northern and Pacific Fleets 16 , however, due to the
fact that the Black Sea Fleet is mostly obsolete 17 , it would seem
more likely that its assets would be scrapped as a suitable way to
meet some budget restrictions. Admiral Kasatanov predicted it would
take two to three years to accomplish any transition 18 . It will
probably take even longer, perhaps until the year 2000, due to the
numerous problems which will be incurred in funding the transitions
and the availability of facilities to which the forces can be
relocated. Russia will not completely do away with the Black Sea
and Baltic Fleets, but these fleets will continue to hold secondary
status to the Northern and Pacific Fleets.
2. The Baltic Fleet
Russia will not retain possession of the entire Baltic
Fleet. Since the Baltic states are now separate entities, they
probably will not contend for their "fair share" of the forces
currently stationed there. Latvia did recently announce the
establishment of its own Navy, which is currently composed of just
one vessel, and expressed the "hope to receive the vessels due to
us from the former Soviet Navy." 19 This statement did not identify
any specific plans regarding this matter, however, and it would not
appear from this minor mention that this will become a highly
debated issue.
It is worthwhile to consider the U.S. threat posed to the
former Soviet Union. From the Russian point of view, by analyzing
the threat scenario developed for Pentagon planning in which Russia
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invades Lithuania 20 , it may seem plausible that the United States
would send six aircraft carrier battle groups into the Baltic Sea
in response.
However, it can be more logically envisioned from the U.S.
perspective that the carriers (and fewer of them) would be
positioned in the Barents Sea as opposed to the Baltic. Thus a
Baltic Fleet would not be an appropriate counterforce to such a
threat. Instead it would prove more appropriate and effective to
utilize Northern Fleet assets to fight off U.S. forces in the
Barents Sea. Thus, in view of these arguments, there appears to be
no need for offensive naval forces in the Baltic Sea.
Admiral Sheafer, the Director of Naval Intelligence,
believes that the Baltic Fleet will become a training fleet "based
mainly in the Kaliningrad Oblast and there will be reduced naval
activity in the Northern Fleet as well." 21 In view of the lack of
a threat in the Baltic Sea the best use of the naval assets in the
area would be to train the Russian fleet.
3 . The Black Sea Fleet:
The biggest controversy in the CIS today by far is the
disposition of the Black Sea Fleet. There have been nearly daily
reports of statements made by various Russian and Ukrainian
officials concerning this issue. The battle seems to bounce back
and forth with no likely solution in sight. Going forward from the
assumption that the CIS will disintegrate by the year 2000, it is
evident that both Russia and the Ukraine will desire to maintain a
fleet of their own in order to check one another. 22
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A major factor in determining who should get what part of
the Black Sea Fleet is what each republic sees as the mission of its
naval forces. A large part of the debate has been over the division
between strategic (nuclear) and non-strategic (non-nuclear) forces.
The. Ukraine says it wants no part of the strategic forces, that it
does not want any of its ships to have nuclear capabilities. 23 The
leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry and the Navy have stated
that there is no possible way to divide the fleet in this way
because the elements of the fleet are interdependent as an
operational-strategic formation. 24 This question of the division of
strategic and non-strategic forces is, in reality, a tool in the
struggle for power between the two republics. It will not be the
deciding factor by which the force division will be accomplished.
The Ukraine calls itself a sea power and argues that it
requires a navy to defend its borders and coast. 25 This sounds
contradictory, but it illustrates that the Ukraine's desire is for
a navy that primarily defends its borders, yet also has the
capability to deploy, if necessary. This makes more sense after
reading the comments of Vladimir Krzhanovskiy
,
plenipotentiary
representative of the Ukraine in Russia. He said in a television
interview:
We are concerned about [naval defense] for one reason only, and
this is that a goodly quarter of our border line is in the sea,
in open waters, and we would like to be protected from this
direction. In principle, we do not feel that we have a
potential enemy. 26
Very directly, this supports a coastal defense mission because the
fact that the Ukraine envisions no enemy means that it has no
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justification for building an offensive force.
Ukraine Navy Commander Rear Admiral Kozhin, in a radio
interview, expressed his opinion that the Black Sea Fleet must be
divided according to the tasks the forces will be expected to
perform. He stated that the three tasks of the Ukrainian navy are
to protect the Ukrainian naval forces in an operational zone, to
protect the economic zone, and to protect the sea borders against
contraband. 27 Again, this supports the requirement for coastal
forces only.
No specific mission is envisioned for either the Russian or
Ukranian fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. The Ukraine Minister of
Defense, Colonel Morozov, was very clear on his country's position
when he said "We have no business there." 28 With the emphasis on
the transition to a primarily coastal navy it would be difficult to
do much more than deploy to the Mediterranean for short periods, and
since there is no perceived threat, it would be pointless to expend
valuable resources there for any length of time. This reasoning
holds true for both the Ukraine and Russia, although Russia has not
publicly commented on this issue.
Reports to date indicate that the Russians have been willing
to offer 10 to 20 percent of the Black Sea Fleet assets to the
Ukraine, but the Ukraine has demanded from 3 percent in some






the assumption that they will eventually come to an agreement, it
is feasible that there could be a compromise by which the Russians
will give the Ukrainians 20 percent.
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As far as berthing/basing requirements are concerned, Russia
would eventually need to build its own base in order to maintain a
separation from the Ukranian forces. There are many bases on
Ukranian territory which both the Russian and Ukranian Fleets would
need for support. The Black Sea Fleet is called
a graphic example of how hard it is to divide up property which
has been built up through joint efforts over the many
centuries of a unified state's existence. 32
As for the other republics bordering the Black Sea, neither
Moldova nor Azerbaijan have expressed any intentions to establish
their own navies on the Black Sea. Georgia will claim part of the
fleet to defend its borders, but says it is not one of its immediate
concerns . 33
The First Deputy Minister of Defense said Georgia "plan(s)
to acquire just some of the warships stationed at the bases of Poti
and Ochamchira" of medium and small tonnage. The minister also
added that the three republics dividing the assets of the Black Sea
Fleet will have to coordinate joint actions because their ships, and
possibly those of Turkey, will routinely enter into each other's
territorial waters. 34 This statement displays a lot of foresight
and realistic expectations on the part of Georgia. It obviously
will not get embroiled in a power play as have Russia and the
Ukraine, and will negotiate reasonably for any claims it makes.
A Belarussian People's Deputy "quite officially" said that
Belarus "has the right to... seven capital ships (naturally,
including aircraft carriers) ,
"
35 but this stand was revised a couple
of days later when it was announced that "Belarus is not a marine
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power and supports Yeltsin's stand on inclusion of the Black Sea
Fleet into CIS strategic forces." 36 It is not clear what Belarus
would do with its own fleet, especially the matter of where it would
station its forces if it were to have pursued standing up its own
navy. With the dissolution of the CIS, Belarus will not play a role
in the negotiations among the republics vying for Black Sea Fleet
assets.
4. The Caspian Flotilla
Finally, the Caspian Flotilla will be divided between the
republics bordering on the Caspian Sea. While the decision on
division has been reached, how the transfer of forces and property
will take place is still to be determined.
The Caspian Flotilla will be divided such that 25 percent
of the Flotilla will remain in Azerbaijan, 25 percent will go to the
CIS Navy, and 50 percent will remain under common command until the
signing of a quadripartite agreement between Russia, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. 37 The 25 percent of the Flotilla
being transferred to Azerbaijan is the amount due to it even before
the signing of the intergovernmental agreement, in accordance with
protocol. 38 Since the CIS is not expected to survive, the Flotilla
will be divided equally between the four republics. Although
Azerbaijan is designated to receive the first 25 percent of the
Flotilla, the other republics will probably insist upon an acquiring
an equal share.
Armenia has expressed concern over Azerbaijan receiving 25
percent of the Flotilla. According to Valeriy Novikov, spokesman
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of the CIS Navy, "no weapons from the Caspian Flotilla have been
handed over to Azerbaijan." 39 Novikov was commenting on Armenian
concern about the "decision to hand over 25 percent of the Caspian
Navy to Azerbaijan when combat activities in Nagorno-Karabakh are
going on." 40 This concern should be addressed at future meetings
between the four republics.
According to Captain Second Rank Nikolay Shumnyy, in charge
of the Caspian Flotilla's activity at the Navy Main Staff, the
Caspian Flotilla's effective strength "contains several combined
units of harbor policing ships and amphibious warfare ships, which
are mainly obsolete but quite combat capable." 41 Until the final
arrangements are made it will be difficult to determine which forces
each of the interested parties will receive. However, each of the
four republics will maintain harbor patrol and amphibious
capabilities as their primary missions . It is evident, though, that
the negotiations over the future of the Flotilla will not follow the
same path as those over the Black Sea Fleet, rather the participants
will be reasonable and cooperative.
5 . Cam Ranh Bay
The forward naval base in Cam Ranh Bay will definitely be
closed down. Currently there is a reduced Russian presence there
of solely support forces totalling 17 vessels. This support will
end due to Viet Nam's request for 400 million dollars annually in
rent which Russia can not afford to pay, and due to the realization




There are unmistakable signs of the reduction in Russian naval
programs, and of the application of "the policy of konvertsiya
(conversion) to naval shipbuilding facilities."* 3
NAVICON [Navy Conversion] Holding Group is a joint venture that
was set up between the Soviet Union and the Nikreis Group:
as the commercial organization for the Navy of the USSR to
convert Navy controlled assets into non-military industrial
concerns and a construction industry first for the Navy and
secondly for the Russian republic as a whole to enable able
bodied seamen to be trained in a commercial career to prepare
for their discharge from service and to create a trained and
commercially viable construction for Russia. 44
On 5 December 1991 the Nikreis Group sent a memorandum to the U.S.
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, which was later retransmitted
to the Naval Intelligence Command, which listed the naval forces to
be scrapped in each fleet. The list of ships planned for scrap
included cruisers, guided missile cruisers, destroyers, anti-
submarine vessels and patrol craft. 45
All cruisers, including the Kiev (Northern Fleet) , Minsk
(Pacific Fleet) , and Novorossiysk (Pacific Fleet) have been in use
for 12 years and are in need of "urgent" repairs. 46 For this reason
they will most likely be scrapped. The only classes of smaller
ships which will survive and continue in production are the Udaloy
and Sovremennyy.
Admiral Chernavin noted that shipbuilding in classes other than
the Kuznetsov is toward small ships with displacements of 2,000-
4,000 tons and surface craft that are used for coastal operations.
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The production of large ASW and large assault ships and guided
missile cruisers is not planned, but the minesweeper forces will be
upgraded. 47 While production of large assault ships is not planned,
production of smaller assault ships will continue solely to maintain
current force levels.
Although the Russians are scrapping many naval vessels, they are
offering other submarines and surface ships for sale. Meanwhile,
shipyard officials are seeking out foreign commercial contracts for
hulls that will take up shipway space previously occupied by naval
vessels. 48 These shipyards may require conversion if merchant ships
are built where naval vessels were previously built. This
conversion of military shipyards to other products will be time-
consuming, will probably require fewer skilled workers, and will
destroy the potential for a long-term rebuilding of naval forces. 49
Some shipyard conversion has already taken place.
The Baltic Shipyard has transferred its efforts from building
naval vessels to building mercantile bulk carriers, while Kommuna
61 (Nikolayev Northern) Shipyard in the Black Sea has not laid any
naval keels since the last Slava class was launched in 1989. The
Admiralty Shipyard in Leningrad will also cease production following
the completion of the last of the Victor Ills. 50
The aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was completed and
transferred to the Northern Fleet where it had been intended to be
stationed from inception as the fleet flagship. She is not expected
to deploy outside the area of operations of the Northern Fleet. 51
The construction of the other two aircraft carriers in the
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Ukrainian shipyard at Nikolayev was halted due to a decision made
by the Ukranian Defense Ministry to complete construction of only
those ships which are currently at more than 50 percent completion
in the shipyards at Nikolayev and Kherson. 52 The carrier Ulyanovsk
has already been cut up for scrap 53 and the work on the Varyag
awaits a decision on the ships future 54 , 55 , 56 . It is foreseen that
the Varyag will be completed and stationed in the Pacific Fleet as
had originally been intended. This will place one aircraft carrier
each in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, providing equal
capabilities where the majority of the Russian naval assets are
stationed.
Admiral Chernavin, in the aforementioned article, argues for
production of the aircraft carrier for reason of its combat
effectiveness and the decrease in the loss of forces encountered in
battle. 57 However, this argument does not stand up to the reality
that the carrier is too expensive to be supported in construction
under the current budget constraints, and that it does not play into
the theory of defensive defense.
Some military hardware has been sold to other countries. For
example, one media report made reference to the assets of the Black
Sea Fleet already being sold off. 58 The report stated that sales
lists for 49 vessels had been prepared by Nevikon-Zyuyd, a joint-
stock company (the same company referred to earlier as NAVICON)
.
Specifically, the report stated that the cruiser Zhdanov had been
sold to India, the guided missile ship Neulovimiy to Italy, and four
patrol boats to Turkey. Plans are to sell 13 more vessels in 1992,
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including coastal craft, minesweepers, missile patrol boats,
amphibious assault craft, and the destroyer Sveduschiy.
A later report intended to clarify the situation indicated that
these sales had been planned prior to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the formation of the Commonwealth. 59 The report also said
that several dozen more sales were already planned, as arranged by
a 1991 directive. These will be obsolete ships and ships from the
auxiliary fleet which include the cruiser Leningrad and four surface
ships.
D. SUMMARY
The CIS Navy will be unevenly divided among the republics by
2000, with Russia retaining the majority of the forces. The
reduction and division of the navy of the former Soviet Union will
affect U. S. policy and programming. While the threat of the former
Soviet Union seems to have diminished, U.S. policymakers must
consider the hardware capability that still exists. Policymakers
must also consider other regions of the world and the ability to
respond to conflicts worldwide, as they consider cutbacks in U. S.
military expenditures. The Northern and Pacific Fleets, while being
reduced, will be the major fleets for Russia. The navy there will
be mostly coastal, capable of deploying for short patrols. While
the U. S. will still deploy to and conduct exercises in the Northern
Sea and Pacific Ocean, this activity will most likely be reduced or
shortened in view of the Russian force reductions in these areas.
The ships remaining in the Baltic Fleet will be used primarily
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for training by Russia. If Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have any-
fleet at all, they will consist mostly of small patrol boats for
coastal defense. The U. S. may reduce exercises in the North Sea
as a result of the outcome of the Baltic Fleet being reduced to a
training fleet.
The Black Sea Fleet will be greatly reduced from what it is
today. It will be divided between Russia and the Ukraine primarily,
with Georgia getting a small share. Once naval assets are divided
here they will be used primarily for coastal defense. The limited
number of ships in the Black Sea Fleet will not seriously affect U.
S. deployments to the Mediterranean Sea. The U. S. will continue
deployments to the Mediterranean in light of other U. S. interests
in the area, despite the probability that Russian and Ukrainian
forces will not deploy to the Mediterranean.
The Caspian Flotilla will eventually be equally divided between
Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. These assets will
be used for harbor patrol and amphibious operations. The Caspian
Flotilla is of no importance to U. S. policymakers.
The former Soviet Union will pull out of Cam Ranh Bay since
this once strategic facility is no longer required. This action
will affect the U. S. in that Russia will not have this base as a
forward base for their BEAR-D/F aircraft and naval forces, once a
visible Soviet presence to U. S. forces in the South China Sea. The
U. S. may also have the opportunity to use this American-built base
once again.
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Reduction in naval shipbuilding will continue, as Russia and
other republics convert their shipyards from naval to commercial
production. Merchant ships will be built both for Russia's own use
and for sale to other countries. If reconstitution of naval ship
building capabilities is necessary in the future, this conversion
will make reconstitution more difficult and time-consuming. It is
possible that the nuclear weapons being removed from ships in the
Black Sea Fleet are being stored locally versus being transferred
to Russia. This would make reconstitution easier and faster in the
event that there is a perceived exterior threat to the republics.
Ships and submarines are also being offered for sale to other
countries or are being scrapped, mostly for financial reasons. The
U. S. will have to monitor sales of former Soviet hardware to other
countries and will need to watch arms transfers as well. In both
cases the U. S. must be aware of which third world countries are
buying what hardware, and possibly even the training provided with
it, in order to be prepared for any conflict.
By 2000, Russia will evolve from the CIS as the dominant naval
force. It will remain a powerful naval force, even though it will
have a much reduced capability.
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This chapter will attempt to accurately evaluate the posture of
former Soviet Naval Aviation as it will exist in the year 2000. In
addition to the assumptions stated in the introduction, several
assumptions specific to aviation will be stated throughout the body
of this chapter. Several assumptions were made necessary primarily
for two reasons. The first is that there was not a great deal of
literature concerning naval aviation. The second is the fact that
it is doubtful that the former republics are sure of what their
wants and needs are going to be or what types of forces they will
be able to maintain.
A number of topics will be discussed in the body of this
chapter: mission/threat as viewed by the former republics, primarily
Russia; disposition of forces; estimation of the aviation order-of-
battle (AOB) ; status of the conventional takeof f-and-landing (CTOL)
carrier program; status of aircraft production; evaluation of





Russia, too, realizes that the Cold War is over and that the
probability of aggression against Russia or other republics
involving not just nuclear weapons but also the large-scale use of
conventional forces will be extremely unlikely. 1 However, Russia
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also realizes that numerous regional military conflicts and clashes
will arise and there will be no guarantee that these local conflicts
and clashes will not lead to "global consequences hazardous to all
mankind. n2 Although Chernavin states that the chief mission of the
navy will be to "avert the unleashing of war...," 3 the navy will
also be tasked with the preservation of the state and the defense
of national power.* It is assumed that naval missions will change
very little from those stated by Chernavin:
The principal missions of the general-purpose forces of our navy
are in essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical
preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic
nuclear system under any conditions and, second, creating and
maintaining such operational conditions in the maritime theaters
that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to
start and wage military operations. 5
Of particular interest for naval aviation, it will be assumed that
Russian:
general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on
enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-
scale operations or those in depth by him, as well as ensuring
the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective
performance of defensive operations in the continental theaters
of military operations in conjunction with other branches of the
armed forces. 6
Thus, land-based naval aviation will retain as primary missions the
traditional ones of reconnaissance and surveillance, antiship
strike, ASW, and aviation support, 7 with antiship strike
constituting the core capability as a result of the above
assumption. In addition, as a result of naval aviation maintaining
a fighter escort capability, it will have coastal defense and
intercept as a secondary mission; Air Force units operating under
the OPCON of the Military District (MD) commanders will have coastal
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defense and intercept as a primary mission.
Although Russia and the other republics will face numerous
regional threats from their neighbors and amongst themselves, Russia
will continue to view the U.S. as its only major potential
adversary; even though U.S. intentions will have changed, U.S.
capability will remain high. It is believed that while the quantity
of U.S. forces will decrease, the quality will continue to increase
and U.S. forces will be even more capable in the future. 8
With respect to disposition, Russia will retain almost all naval
aviation and will continue to maintain forces in all four fleet
areas, albeit the presence in the Baltic and Black Sea areas will
be diminished. The number of aircraft across the board will have
decreased with those remaining being of the highest capability and
quality available.
With respect to the Russian republic, the Aviation of Air
Defense (APVO) will have been absorbed by the Air Force. All
fighter aircraft with the exception of those assigned to naval
aviation will be assigned to the Air Force. It will be responsible
for defense against all airborne and space-based threats; thus,
primary missions will include coastal defense, intercept, and air
superiority. The Air Force will also be responsible for long-range
and short-range strike against land targets and close air support
(CAS) of ground forces.
Russia will form three Military Districts (MDs) , Western,
Siberian, and Eastern, which will function very much like U.S.
unified and specified commands. The Air Force CINC will be similar
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to a U.S. type commander in that he will be responsible for
allocating assets to the MD CINCs. The Air Force allocated assets
will have respective commanders who report to the MD CINC with
respect to operational matters and the Air Force CINC with respect
to administrative matters. The MD CINCs will be responsible for and
have operational control of everything in their respective districts
with the exception of land-based naval aviation. Close coordination
will exist between the Fleet CINCs, who will have OPCON of naval
aviation, and the MD CINCs. There will also be an overall Navy CINC
who will be on a par with the Air Force CINC. They will have
authority to shift assets between MDs and Fleets as operational
necessity dictates.
The continued support for the CTOL carrier program is not
surprising. In a thesis written by Stanley G. Stefansky in 1985,
he concluded that
:
The Politburo has come to accept the role of attack aircraft
carriers in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives in
the developing world. The aircraft carrier complements well
their apparent acceptance of a greater military role in Third
World crises. The Soviets realize that the attack aircraft
carrier provides certain military advantages not apparent in
other forms of weaponry. They perceive in aircraft carriers a
means of projecting Soviet airpower to distant areas of the
world where access to land-based airfields is not guaranteed.
It is also a means of protecting naval assets at sea and of
competing for 'air supremacy,' a critical prerequisite for
gaining sea control in theaters of operations areas far removed
from friendly fighter bases.
The local war mission will not be the aircraft carrier's only
role in the overall Soviet military doctrine. The Soviets
appreciate the mission flexibility of this type of ship and it
will surely be tasked to perform many missions of which defense
of the homeland is primary. However, the local war mission
appears to be extremely important and probably provided one of
the major rationales for the decision to build it. 9
Although his thesis was written with the communist regime in mind,
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the rationale that justified its building then continues to exist
and will continue to exist. The argument for justification of a
CTOL carrier, from the Russian point of view, can be made much
stronger today in view of the fact that the threat of nuclear war
has greatly diminished and as a result the threat of losing a
carrier during time of crisis has greatly diminished. This, in
essence, would make the now less vulnerable, multipurpose CTOL
carrier a much more cost effective platform and lucrative prospect.
Russia and Ukraine will be the only two republics to retain any
significant AOB, with Russia retaining all significant naval
aviation. As stated in the introduction Ukraine is to receive 20
percent of the Black Sea Fleet; however, it is assumed that Ukraine
will elect to retain a negligible percentage of Black Sea Fleet
aviation. With respect to the existing bomber and fighter/FGA
aircraft of naval aviation, it is assumed only the TU-22/-22M, SU-
24, SU-25, and MIG-23 will be retained. All TU-16 bomber, SU-17,
YAK-38, and MIG-27 aircraft will be sold, scrapped, or, if retained,
reduced to such a poor material condition of readiness as to be
useless
.
Based on the above assumption, the Northern Fleet will retain
95 TU-22/-22Ms, 10 SU-25s, and 10 MIG-23s; the Baltic Fleet will
retain 20 TU-22/-22MS and 100 SU-24s; the Black Sea Fleet will
retain 66 TU-22/-22MS; and the Pacific Fleet will retain 60 TU-22/-
22Ms and 10 SU-24s. 10 The total number of bomber/strike and
fighter/FGA for the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, as
estimated above, would be 301 aircraft. This is roughly 25 percent
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less than the number envisioned by Chernavin:
As for aviation, we are realizing the decision to restrict the
strike and fighter aviation of shore-based naval units in the
Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets to an overall level of
400 combat aircraft, which signifies a reduction of 60 percent. 11
It is assumed that naval aviation will acquire an undetermined
number of Flankers to escort the Backfires and Fencers.
Yeltsin has declared that production of the TU-160 Blackjack
will stop at a level equivalent to the Bl-B and that production of
the TU-142 Bear will stop altogether. 12 However, even though the
YAK-141 Freestyle STOV/L, MIG-29K naval Fulcrum, MIG-31M Improved
Foxhound, and the SU-25T all-weather attack aircraft programs have
been cut, four other programs have been preserved. "These include
two next-generation fighters, a major upgrade to the SU-27 Flanker,
and a jet trainer to replace the L-39." 13 The SU-27K naval Flanker
is currently still in production. The improved Flanker, SU-27M with
new fire-control radar and avionics, is scheduled to deploy sometime
after 1995. The next-generation fighters, termed the Fulcrum 2000
(MRF--Multi-Role Fighter) and the Flanker 2000 (LRMRF--Long Range
Multi-Role Fighter) , have been estimated to enter service sometime
between 1996 and 2005. 14 The emphasis on going ahead with the new
fighter programs is that they will hopefully provide a source of
hard currency, as advanced fighters have done in the past.
The ability to reconstitute air assets will be virtually
nonexistent. Front-line aircraft will be limited in numbers and
those in storage will be in such a poor material condition of
readiness as to make them useless. Additional hardware would have
to be produced which would put a severe strain on an already weak
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economy. A critical, but often overlooked, area will be the
shortage of trained pilots and an inability to train additional
pilots quickly.
Even though the smaller republics will remain very cautious and
wary with respect to Russian power and their perceived threat of
Russian imperialism, defense agreements of various flavors will
exist between them and Russia. It is assumed that Russia will sign
military support agreements with those republics which do not form
their own armed forces, particularly the weaker Asian republics.
Agreements, treaties, and alliances of a more intricate and
complicated nature will evolve between Russia and the republics
which form their own armed forces and possibly between Russia and
some of the former Warsaw Pact nations. Of primary importance will
be agreements concerning the sharing and cooperation of airborne
early warning information. Others will likely concern basing
agreements, logistics support, spare parts, mutual support, and
pilot training.
C. SUMMARY
As Chernavin has stated, the long run missions of the Russian
Navy and thus naval aviation will not change. Naval aviation will
maintain forces in all four fleet areas; actual numbers of aircraft
will be reduced with the highest quality aircraft being retained.
Two CTOL carriers will be operational but the airwings will still
be developing. Their primary missions will include fleet air
defense, power projection, and defense of the homeland. The APVO
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will be absorbed by the Air Force which will be responsible for
coastal defense and air intercept. Although defense spending will
be considerably reduced, emphasis will be placed on the quality of
advanced technology aircraft and air-delivered weapons, not the
quantity.
Implications regarding U.S. policy will include the following:
- although reconstitution capability has been deemed low, the
U.S. must not underestimate the ability and will of the Russian
people in the event of a crisis with Russia.
- even though pilot skill and training will likely be low, third
world nations will be able to obtain advanced aircraft,
particularly fighters.
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This chapter will give a description and explanation of the
reform process that is ongoing within the General Purpose Forces
(GPF) and its direct impact on the Russian Naval Infantry (RNI)
.
Next, a short background and summary of the RNI will be given along
with their missions and strategic value. Lastly, an attempt will
be made to describe the structure and order of battle of the RNI in
the year 2000 and the implications to U.S. national security policy.
B. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
As stated above by the year 2000 the total personnel of the
Russian Armed forces will probably stand at close to 1.5 million. 1
The ground forces then will most likely still occupy the largest
percentage of the force though not in such a strong degree as in the
past and probably stand at approximately 720, 000. 2 The existing
Russian GPF will be professional, structured around a defensive
doctrine that emphasizes high mobility and high operational
readiness, and most importantly equipped with the some of the most
modern conventional equipment.
The changes taking place in the GPF will have a direct impact
on all parts of the armed forces mainly because of the historical
seniority of the GPF. The GPF more than any other branch of the
Russian armed forces, are being affected by the most drastic reform
since the 1917 revolution. Just one example of the many important
vast changes taking place is the restructuring of the military
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district system, which will result in there being only three
streamlined military districts within Russia where there used to be
16 in the former Soviet Union. 3
The military reform of the GPF is predicted to go through
several phases with the transitional phase lasting two to three
years and by the year 2 000 all changes should be firmly
established. 4 The reform process is being influenced by several
factors with the major ones being the socio-economic situation, the
impact of the Gulf war, the CFE treaty, and most importantly day to
day politics.
1. GPP POLITICS
The historic monopoly that the GPF had on the General Staff
has most likely come to an end based on two important events. The
first was the decision by President Yeltsin to appoint Air Marshall
Shaposhnikov as head of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) , which coincidently is slowly being
transformed into the Armed Forces of Russia. The appointment of an
Air Force officer to head the Armed Forces was a first in the
history of Russia. This was a political-military decision that can
be attributed to the loyalty of Shaposhnikov to democratic reform
which was demonstrated by his actions during the coup.
Additionally, it appears that the political-military leadership is
holding air assets in higher esteem in view of the post Gulf war
analysis.
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The Gulf war was viewed by many senior military members as
a "revolution of military affairs" and gave credibility to the
predictions of General Ogarkov concerning the "Military-Scientific
Revolution. " The lessons learned from the Gulf war have fueled
this debate between ground and air superiority. The ongoing debate
in the Russian military hierarchy will most likely be won in the
long run by advocates of air superiority. There appears to be
general consensus that the coalition air forces and advanced
conventional munitions were at a minimum the critical force
responsible for the quick and decisive victory. This, in addition
to the appointment of General Grachev, an airborne/light infantry
officer, to First Deputy Defense Minister will translate to a lower
stature for the ground forces in general and more specifically to
the advocates of massed armored forces. 5
2 . SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
As stated in chapter II the socio-economic situation in
Russia appears to be the key factor in the military reform process.
The withdrawal of GPF from the former Warsaw Pact, Mongolia, Cuba,
Libya, and other areas around the globe is a number one priority for
not only the Russians but for some of the host countries, such as
is the case with the Baltic Republics. The problem here is the
already strained logistical resources in Russia are not capable of
removing these forces or providing them decent living conditions
when they do return. Moreover, recalling the GPF is more
complicated that air and naval assets, since these forces will have
to transit across what is quickly becoming unfriendly if not hostile
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areas. This recall of GPF troops is a paradox since the government
of Russia desperately wants to gather all of the personnel and
equipment of the GPF, yet they do not currently have the resources
to support the move. 6 This inability to immediately recall all of
the GPF, especially in the Groups of Forces Germany, is being driven
by the socio-economic conditions in Russia. Keeping the military
content in the near future is definitely a high priority of the
Russian government.
A very prevalent theme in the Russian government is the
necessity to provide for the social concerns of current and former
military members. The Russian government's considerations over
these social concerns are based on respect and stature of the GPF
but most importantly the current leadership clearly understands that
the GPF prevented the success of the coup and have been surprisingly
passive in the momentous events that have taken place over the last
three years. It is therefore valid to assume that reducing the
military in the transitional stage is as dependent on the socio-
economic forces as any perceived military threat.
3. Other Mllitary/Para-military Forces
In addition to the Russian military, which will eventually
include the Strategic forces, there will exist at least one other
notable military force. The MVD (Ministry Troops of Internal
Affairs) , which has been disbanded, will most likely re-appear as
a national guard/internal security force that probably will not
exceed 100,000 men. This force will be equipped with armored
personnel vehicles and helicopters but will not have heavy artillery
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or main battle tanks. Another military force that could appear in
the near future, though it is highly unlikely, would be that of a
Republic peace-keeping force under the command of the CIS and
constituted from volunteer forces of various republics. 7 The
Russian national guard will appear but the peace-keeping forces of
volunteers are probably never going to come to fruition, at least
under the command of the CIS. Neither of these forces will carry
much combat power, and therefore possess no strategic value.
C. BACKGROUND OP THE RNI
Tsar Peter the Great established the first Russian naval
infantry regiment in 1705. It was utilized in the Russo-Turkish War
1768-1774, in Greece in 1799, and in the war against Napoleon in
1812. After this war the RNI was done away with and only token
naval infantry units were employed in subsequent conflicts. The RNI
reappeared late in World War I, but this time with a new look.
Organic support to include artillery, machine guns, and signal units
were now present. The RNI was used in WWI, the October Revolution
of 1917, and during the Civil War of 1919-1922. Once the Civil War
was over, the RNI was again disbanded and would not be reestablished
again until 1939. In 1940 a decision was made to form sailors into
a unit for use ashore. The 1st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade was
at the time of the invasion the only marine unit in the Russian
armed forces. After the RNI * s impressive record in the Great
Patriotic War, they were once again disbanded in 1947, when
conventional forces in all of the super powers became unpopular. 8
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The marines came into their own as a branch in 1960, when they
were greatly expanded. In the early 1980' s they were reorganized
once again when the Coastal Defense Force (CDF) was restored by the
Soviet Navy and absorbed two former branches, the Soviet Naval
Infantry (SNI) and the Coastal Missile Artillery Force (CMAF) . This
reorganization of the Navy's land-based coastal defense force was
probably initiated as a result of Soviet force reductions and their
declared defensive doctrine. Since at least 1986, a distinct trend
in Soviet military writings indicates that a re-examination of
coastal defense concepts has been underway. This scrutiny will no
doubt intensify during the restructuring phase in the near future.
One Soviet source has stated that the Coastal Force is a revival of
the old Coastal Defense Service that was a major branch of the Navy
from 1926 until its abolition in the early 1960's. 9
In 1990 three Motorized Rifle Divisions were transferred to the
Soviet Navy in an attempt to exempt their equipment from the
Conventional Force in Europe treaty (CFE) . Currently each western
fleet's land-based coastal defense force now combines a former
motorized rifle division, renamed a coastal defense division (CDD)
,
Naval Infantry, and a Coastal Missile Artillery Force. The same
structure had previously existed within the Pacific Ocean Fleet.
1. Missions
Russian marines are a part of the navy and are an elite
force with a high esori t de corps that is based in large part on
their valorous past. Marines are likened to motorized riflemen.
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They belong however, to the naval forces and have not only the
weapons of the motorized riflemen but special weapons and skills,
such as rockets and amphibious vehicles, and they are trained for
amphibious warfare. Although they have extensive training in
riverine crossings and in the defense of naval bases, their main
mission is to act as the initial assault force. They are plainly
intended to "hit the beaches" and securing objectives on enemy-
coasts first opening the way for the larger follow-on forces of the
GPF. Marines can work in close cooperation with both ground and air
forces
.
As stated above, although the RNI is under the control of
the CDF its primary mission and training emphasis has not been
restricted to defense of the coast but rather toward amphibious
assaults/landings. This is a military operation of the RNI that has
both tactical and strategic significance especially since the
transfer of the MRDs to the Western Fleets. The amphibious landing
is conducted in close cooperation with ground and air forces
according to a common plan. The primary goal of an amphibious
landing is to capture and occupy enemy territory from the sea and
the air. Additionally, sea landings can serve to support operations
of the ground forces taking place in the direction of the coast.
Finally, sea landings can serve to establish new bases of operation
for the fleet by capturing ports, islands, or important island
groups
2. Current Disposition of the RNI
The RNI is under the administrative control of the CDF as
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is the CMAF and the newly transferred CDDs . The Pacific Ocean Fleet
Coastal Defense Force (CDF) consists of a 6,000-man naval infantry
division, which is the largest contingent in the 4 fleets, and
8,500-man CDD, and a CMAF.
The Northern Fleet CDF consists of two naval infantry
brigades (one cadre strength) , a CDD, and a CMAF.
The Baltic Fleet CDF consists of a naval infantry brigade,
a CDD, a CMAF, and two naval artillery brigades.
The Black Sea Fleet CDF consists of a naval infantry-
brigade, a CDD, a CMAF, and one naval artillery brigade. (The
future of the Naval Infantry of the Black Sea Fleet is currently
cloudy. Most likely Ukraine will attempt to retain the majority of
these assets since they are technically part of the Coastal Defense
Forces, and coastal defense is a legitimate justification for the
Ukraine in its military doctrine. The problem arises for the
Ukraine in logistically supporting this force. Not only is it
expensive to man equip and train these elite troops, but the
industrial base that supports the spare parts for the majority of
the TLE is located in Russia). 10
The total strength of the Soviet Naval Infantry with the
recently transferred MRDs should not exceed 70,000 men including the
higher staffs and support troops as well as the training elements.
The existence of these troops is significant, especially in view of
the deployment of amphibious ships such as the Ivan Rogov and the
emphasis that was in the Soviet writings on the external role of the
Soviet Armed Forces. 11 The presence of the MRDs in a coastal
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defense role would not exclude their availability for amphibious
warfare operations since the majority of their equipment is
compatible with amphibious warfare ships.
The heaviest concentration of marines was in the Baltic area
where the two brigades were the strongest. The marine infantry-
brigades are of varying strengths. Strong brigades have up to four
regiments while the weaker ones have only two. Other brigades nay
be structured similar to the motorized rifle regiment.
3. Organization of the RNI
The organization of a marine infantry regiment is similar
to that of a motorized rifle regiment in a MRD and is a combined
arms fighting force. The organization of a regiment clearly shows
its vast capabilities: 12
- Regimental headquarters and staff platoon,
- Reconnaissance company,
- Engineer company,
- NBC defense platoon,
- Supply company,
- Tank battalion with a headquarters, staff and supply
platoon, and three companies (each with 10 PT-76's),
- Three marine infantry battalions with a headquarters, staff
and supply platoon, three marine infantry companies (each
with seven armored personnel carriers) , a mortar platoon




4 . Primary Equipment:
The Marines are equipped with the amphibious
reconnaissance/scout tank PT-76 and the BTR-60PB armored personnel
carrier, while the newly transferred MRDs are mostly equipped with
T-72 and T-80 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers. Some of
these armored vehicles of the MRDs were not designed for amphibious
operations and therefore have limited use for such operations.
5 . Support Equipment
The merchant marine fleet of the former Soviet Union was key
to the deployment of the naval infantry and other ground forces.
The fleet has 110 commercial roll on/roll off (RO/RO) ships making
it possible for tanks and other military vehicles to be loaded and
transported to foreign nations without detection by national means
of inspection (i.e., satellite surveillance). Additional RO/RO
ships, all of which can serve as military sealift or logistics
ships, are on order. 13 These additional ships will probably be
completed since they also hold important civilian use, but their
availability in the future for combat operations is not as secure
as in the past when the civilian industry of the past would
immediately heed to orders from Moscow.
The RNI have approximately 80 amphibious ships of different
classes that are barely enough to carry the assigned seamen and
equipment. As stated in Chapter V, these amphibious classes of
ships will probably not continue to be manufactured in the near
future. Nevertheless, these remaining ships will probably be
maintained in order to support the critical RNI mission, while the
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ROROs can be used for the CDD's once a beachhead or port is
established. Additionally, the former Soviet Union was the largest
operator of military air cushion vehicles. These vehicles are
extremely valuable in that they provide a high-speed across-the-
beach assault capability which reduces the vulnerability of troops.
They are also well suited for shallow or ice covered waters as are
found in the Baltic. 14
D. IMPACT OP CFE/RECONSTITUTION
The CFE can turn into a major altercation between several of the
Republics in the very near future. All of the affected former
Republics have made public statements to the effect that they
support ratification of the treaty in their legislative bodies. The
problem though, is that the former republics have also made
statements declaring the formation of their respective armies and
with the stated size of these armies the combination of the numbers
of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) would be in violation of the
CFE. 15 This altercation could play out in several ways, the most
likely being that the armies of the Republics will be reduced to
levels that will not violate the TLE requirement. In the short run,
however, Ukraine and Byelarus have been making statements suggesting
that Russia absorb the majority of the reductions of TLE.
Another CFE related issue was that during the negotiations the
former USSR transferred three MRDs to the CDF in an attempt to
exempt them from the TLE provisions and to bring naval arms control
into the treaty. This move in effect assigned more tanks to the
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Soviet Navy than the total tanks in the British army. 16 This issue
was later worked out by the all the signatories agreeing that all
TLE in the Atlantic To The Urals (ATTU) should be counted whether
it was part of land based naval forces or not. The end result was
a much strengthened CDF that now plays in the strategic analysis.
E. RNI IN THE YEAR 2000
By the year 2000 the whole Russian military, to include the GPF
and RNI will have completed the transition under the military reform
program. During the transitional period, though, the GPF and RNI
will be degraded considerably, probably only being able to provide
regional security and defense missions. This decline in military-
capability will be short lived.
When the GPF does complete the reform process the CDF, CDD,
CMAF, and specifically the RNI will definitely resemble the "meaner
and leaner" concept and will truly regain the elite stature that
they held earlier in the century. This will be accomplished by the
downsizing of personnel and equipment in other parts of the GPF with
their eventual transfer to the CDF. The transfer of new combat
equipment and personnel will at a minimum replace other assets and
at a maximum greatly strengthen the combat potential of this force.
The logic for the equipment transfer will be based on continuing to
make a point on including naval arms control in future CFE-1A
negotiations and the defensive-defense doctrine needed by Russia
now more than ever in the new geo-strategic environment of eurasia.
The military will have a mostly professional force, that is highly
100




The concept of operations of the RNI will in general remain the
same, but will probably attempt to incorporate much more combined
arms integration, and defense training aimed against enemies with
advanced conventional munitions. Furthermore, the GPF and RNI will
with much difficulty strive to develop their own equipment in line
with the "military-technical revolution.
"
Although research and development for ground forces will be cut
drastically we can expect to see the deployment of weapon systems
already developed, such as the BMP-3 improved armored personnel
carrier. The older equipment in the inventory will either be
destroyed, sold, or stored east of the Urals in compliance with the
CFE treaty. The RNI specifically will be equipped with an improved
PT-7 6, BTR-80 APC ' s while the CDDs will have the T-80UM, BMP-3s, and
advanced anti-tank missiles with all the equipment having thermal
night acquisition capabilities.
The reconstitution capability of the GPF will remain high since
the vast majority of TLE stored east of the Urals will not
deteriorate due to the cold dry climate. Many of the armored
vehicles can be easily brought up to working condition by some
routine maintenance and battery replacement. Much of this TLE is
modern equipment, while the obsolete TLE and excess equipment will




In the transitional period of reform (3-5 years) the general
trends that can be expected are sizable force reductions,
degradation of operational readiness, reduced mobilization
potential, and most importantly an inability to conduct large scale
offensive operations. In the short run, the U.S. military will not
be perceived as a threat to Russia, even though the U.S. is still
considered to have an extensive military capability. The key
concept to keep in mind for the future is that intentions are very-
difficult to recognize, while capabilities are not.
In the long run the GPF and RNI specifically will transform into
a force that could easily execute the Pentagon's Lithuanian invasion
scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO. This is predicated on the
assumption of the predicted size of NATO and the U.S. forces in
Europe in 1995. The bottom line is that although the vast
quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will get
smaller they will become more lethal.
Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and
therefore more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post
exercises for headquarters elements combined with simulator training
for vehicle crews. Additionally, the GPF, to include the RNI, might
be inclined to volunteer their forces for peace-keeping duties, if
for no other reason than for minimal training value, deferment of
training costs, and the implied political gains of showing the
Russian flag. There will probably be an emphasis on low intensity
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conflict intervention, in view of the problems arising in the new
multi-polar environment.
The RNI will evolve by the year 2000 into a highly elite, well
trained combat force that when called upon and supported properly,
can be the sharp dagger of Russian hegemony. The GPF, as its
history for centuries has proven, will remain the broadsword of the
land fighting capability. Only time will tell if the future Russian
military will again pose a threat to the security of Europe, but as
in any other inter-war period, a wary eye should be constantly
looking toward any possible adversary. A famous Greek philosopher
once said that the only soldier who knows no more war is the dead
one. Regrettably, history has made this a truism.
1. This was also stated by President Yeltsin who envisages an Army
which is professional, mobile, unburdened by administrative
structures - small, but large enough to defend the country. In
this same article the cut of the armed forces is said to be from
2.5 million to 1.5 million or 1.25 million. "Armed Forces
Resurrection Linked to Statehood", carried by Moscow
Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in
Russian 2000 May 9, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-092 , May 12, 1992, p. 27).
2. This figure is based on the assumption of 60 divisions with
approximately 12,000 personnel per division.
3. Interview with Aleksandr Kotenkov, deputy leader of the Russian
president's State-Law Administration, by Captain Second Rank O.
Odnokolenko, "Kontenkov Interviewed on Armed Forces Role, " date
and place not given: "We Should Create Ministry of Military
Reform," Krasnava Zvezda . in Russian April 14, 1992 p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-
92-074, April 16, 1992, pp. 32-34).
4. This transitional period is prevalent in all of the public
statements coming out of Russia.
5. General Grachev was quoted as saying that "alongside the
traditional branches of service (Rocket and Ground Forces, Air
Defense Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy, which it is planned to
preserve until 1995) there is a need for mobile forces - a new
operational strategic formation of along the lines of the rapid
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deployment force. These will include airborne assault combined
units, military transport and Army aviation, and mobile support
services for all arms of service, and will be capable of carrying
out their mission in any sector of operations." Reported by
Colonel O. Falichev, "Grachev Details Armed Forces Creation
•Concept'," Krasnava Zvezda in Russian, May 26, 1992, p. 1 (FBIS-
SOV-92-101, May 26, 1992, pp. 24-25.
6. In this newscast the text read "RIA today carried a statement by
Dmitriy Volkogonov, Russian People's deputy and President Yeltsin's
military affairs counselor, in which he said Russia intends to take
under its wing all military units that have not yet been taken
under the jurisdiction of other republics. Not a single Russian
soldier or officer must remain without political and social
protection, Dmitry Volkogonov said." From the "Novosti" broadcast
carried by the Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First
Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT April 8, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-069,
April 9, 1992, p. 19)
.
7. Interview with Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey
Afanasiyevich Kokoshin by presenter Mishina; from the "Novosti"
news cast - live, "Defense Official on Armed Forces Coexistence,
"
carried by Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First
Program Network in Russian 1100 GMT May 11, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-092
,
May 12, 1992, p. 27)
.
8. Defense Intelligence Report, The Soviet Naval Infantry .
(Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p.l.
9. Department of Defense, 1991 Military Force in Transition
(Washington, D.C: GPO, 1991), 58.
10. Article by Navy Coastal Troops Chief Lieutenant-General I.
Shuratov: "Nationalize and . . .Disband? What will be the Fate of
the Coastal Troops of the Black Sea Fleet?", "Ukraine's Claim on
Black Sea Naval Infantry," Krasnava Zvezda , March 12, 1992, p. 1
(JPRS-UMA-92-012, April 8, 1992, pp. 31-32).
11. Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, The Armed Forcps of the
USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 177.
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D.C: GPO, 1984), p. 4-8.
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Office, 1985), pp. 50-51.
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15. This problem was supposedly solved at the May 1992 CIS Tashkent
Summit, but might still become a problem as reported in the article
"General Staff Officer on Division of Weaponry" by Major-General
Vadim Grechaninov, chief of the Center for Operational-Strategic
Research of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:
"Divorce Moscow-Style, " carried in Kiev Golos Ukrainv in Russian,
April 2, 1992, p. 3. (JPRS-UMA-92-014, April 22, 1992, pp. 4-5).
16. SIPRI Yearbook 1991 . 1991 ed. , s.v. "Conventional Arms Control
in Europe, " by Jane M.O. Sharp.
17. In an "'Appended' Statement Issued" to the Resolution on
Military Priorities, it was stated "The Russian Armed Forces should
be designed exclusively for the protection of the independence and
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and
also for the fulfillment of Russia's international
commitments ... the deterrent to the unleashing of large-scale
conflicts and local wars against Russia and other CIS member states
should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of
delivery. . .For the prompt neutralization of possible local military
conflicts, it is necessary to create highly mobile general purpose
forces consisting of several ground forces groupings and naval
groupings." Statement on the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities,"
appended to April 1, 1992 resolution, carried by the Moscow
Rossivkava Gazeta in Russian April 8, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-069 , April




- The political situation in the former Soviet Union has called
military policy and doctrine into close review.
- Collective security of former Soviet republics has not been
agreed to by a sizable number of republics.
- The military policy of the Russian Federation calls for the
prevention of war, primacy of defense of the homeland,
strengthening of international stability, and an overall
defensive framework.
- "Defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency" remain the
guiding principles of russian military doctrine.
- Russian military doctrine views no state as an enemy.
- "Reasonable sufficiency" has taken on increased importance due
to the economic troubles of the former Soviet Union.
- "Defensive defense" has taken on a more strictly coastal
character for the former Soviet Navy.
- High technology, mobility, professionalism, social protection
of the troops, and downsizing are the military-technical
concepts of Russian military doctrine receiving the most
emphasis in open literature.
- Ukrainian military policy and doctrine are defensive in nature
and call for defense of the homeland, nuclear free and bloc
free status.
- President Yeltsin promised that 60 percent of the new military-
budget would be used for social issues.
- Procurement levels have been cut by about 80 percent from
levels in the same period last year.
- Current military spending appears to be about 4.5 percent of
Gross National Product.
- Expenditures for shipbuilding dropped in 1990 and 1991, and
funds allocated for ship maintenance and research and
development were cut.
- Many of the principal surface combatants are currently in port
or coastal waters, and their tactical nuclear weapons are
being removed.
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- The Pacific Fleet headquarters has moved from the designated
afloat flagship to ashore.
- Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia have expressed a desire for part
of the Black Sea Fleet.
- Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have laid
claim to parts of the Caspian Flotilla.
- The Russian Navy will no longer use Cam Ranh Bay port
facilities
.
- Russia is selling and scrapping many surface ships, and some
shipyards are already being converted for construction of
commercial ships.
- The former-Soviet Union ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
force will be smaller, more survivable, and more accurate.
- The Russian SSBN order-of-battle will exist as a deterrent
force. .
- START requirements will slash the number of SSBNs; Typhoons and
Delta IVs will be the mainstay of the force.
- There are no SSBNs under construction nor will any be
introduced into service during the 1990s.
- Total equivalent megatonnage for the whole SSBN force is 360-
411.7.
- SSBNs will continue to patrol in traditional bastion areas.
- Russian general purpose submarines (SSNs, SSs, and SSGNs) will
ensure "strategic stability" for the SSBNs by providing an
defense in-depth.
- Russian general purpose submarines will undergo a radical
numerical reduction; however, construction on newer, more
capable units will continue, albeit at a reduced rate.
- Russia is trying and will continue to try to sell advanced
fighter aircraft for hard currency.
- The SU-27K, Fulcrum 2000, and Flanker 2000 advanced fighter
programs have been preserved.
- The Russian economy will not be able to support the current
force structure and, as a result, naval aviation and aviation
in general can be expected to make substantial reductions.
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- There is no evidence to support that a change in the
traditional missions of naval aviation will occur.
- Development continues on CTOL aircraft.
- The Russian Naval Infantry will remain a strong viable force
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
The former Soviet Union will continue to face severe economic
and political problems throughout the 1990s. These problems will
determine the direction of the future military policy and doctrine
of the Russian Federation. The CIS will not remain the premier
security agency in Central Eurasia. Some states will sign
collective security agreements, as has already been done, but the
Russian state will remain the real military power in the region.
The policy and doctrine of Russia will view no state as an enemy,
concentrate on downsizing, defense of the homeland, international
stability, professionalization, high-tech improvements, and
cooperation with international peacekeeping organizations. The
relationship between Russia and Ukraine will be strained, but will
not evolve into open conflict.
The economic outlook for the former Soviet Union is dismal. Real
growth in the economy will be negligible. The military's portion
of the budget will be 4 . 5 percent and will severely impact training.
The procurement cycle will be drastically reduced with relatively
few new construction units entering the service by 2000. The impact
on training will lower the quality of forces, even in those areas
where hardware reductions result in qualitatively better forces. The
research and development budget decrease will result in an
increasing technology gap favoring the U.S.
The Naval leg of the nuclear triad will remain the preeminent
force in the Navy. The SSBNs will remain totally under Russian
control. The numbers will be decreased both in hulls and missiles,
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and the deployments will consist entirely of bastion patrols.
Qualitatively the SSBN force will be leaner and meaner.
General purpose submarines will undergo radical reductions. The
submarine force will be qualitatively better but will suffer from
severe training problems due to lack of underway time.
The surface forces will suffer the same reductions that the
other forces have seen and probably to a greater extent than the
submarine force. The Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla will be
divided and will decrease in importance. The Pacific Ocean Fleet
and the Northern Fleet will remain exclusively Russian. Deployment
cycles will remain as they are now, at an extremely low level with
almost no overseas patrols. This reduction will also make
reconstitution of forces more difficult.
Naval aviation will continue its work in all Fleet areas but
with greatly reduced numbers. The quality will increase in the
hardware as in the other branches, but again training will be the
downfall. The carrier program will not be ended but will be greatly
reduced. PVO will be absorbed into Strategic Defense Forces.
Russian Naval Infantry will also adhere to the leaner and meaner
concept. Concentration will be on high mobility and greater
firepower. Some units will be taken over by Ukraine but the vast
majority of the CDF, of which the RNI is a part, will remain under
Russian control.
Implications for the US are: decreased contact with Russian
forces on the high seas; decreased justification for Centurion and
Seawolf; greater security for US SSBNs; lowering of possible
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confrontations with Russia; increased cooperation on regional and
international security issues; and lower defense budgets if
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